THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

Vol. XXI SEPTEMBER 1950 No. 9

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

273

The expressions of the physical nd moral devastation caused by he fury and hatred of war are so ery many that we are apt often to verlook the deeds of love and sacifice which are its real glory and ictory. Military victories and efeats are mostly an illusion. The atred which infects large masses on ither side is the real defeat of the ar. When fighters return to their ative lands coloured by vice and arshness and pride, they proclaim e defeat which their country has ffered. The real victory of war is ained by those few who withstood e fury of enmity and hatred, who ought without malice and with some harity and who return whole of oul, however maimed in body.

On the moral plane, defeat and ictory of the last ghastly war still emain to be assessed. Economic nd political defeats and victories re ephemeral and illusory, and that once again becoming clear in the urrent events, especially at Lake uccess. The greater the necessity, hen, to be on the lookout for any record of moral strength, intellectual generosity, spiritual sacrifice, on the part of individuals, or groups of them, on either side. Victory is centred in beneficence, which brotherliness radiates; defeat in the ugliness which hate spreads. Thus one of the mysteries of war is that neither party gains victory or suffers defeat. Each has gains and losses on the moral plane, and the balance of moral power must weigh more with the truly victorious. This invisible process, in which the individual plays a very important part, goes on unobserved by economists, politicians and militarists. These leaders are blind to the unrealities of war and suspect not the nature of real victory.

The ghastly effects of the atom bomb on Hiroshima are described in a thousand publications. Acts of mighty valour shown by some among the sufferers are not sung; nor is the deep resentment felt by many United States citizens towards their own Government for perpetrating this act properly assayed. The atom bomb

did not win the war for the Allies, nor has it brought defeat and disgrace to Japan. We are once again reminded of this by the noble effort started last September by *The Saturday Review of Literature*. Its Editor, Norman Cousins, visited the city and wrote from there an account of the resurrection of Hiroshima. How the hospital, under Karma, became the target of the fatal bomb; how "the heart of a city was laid open with a hot knife"; how "if you lived through that second, you found that your clothes were on fire, and your arms and legs and face were on fire";—it was a moving account in *The Saturday Review of Literature* for 17th September 1949. But we wish to note the movement of love which it and its humane Editor started: the high-spot of his visit was the Yamashita Orphanage. His moving account should be read—the heroism of the Yamashitas; their vision and resourcefulness rooted in what the Buddhist called *Metta*—love, tenderness and mercy; how they created their home where orphans found parents; "there was not enough of it." It moved the American editor and gentle man to his own vision and action. He wrote:—

Before coming to Japan, several people had told me that they would like to adopt Japanese children orphaned by the bombing. Under the Oriental Exclusion Act, however, these adoptions are not possible. I should like to suggest the next best thing—moral adoptions. By moral adoptions I am thinking of Hiroshima children who would be adopted by American families and who would carry the names of the people adopting them. The children would continue to live in Japan—perhaps in some place such as Mrs. Yamashita's—but the American families would be responsible for their care and upbringing. Then, later, if Congress passes a law permitting Japanese children to come to America, these morally adopted children could become legally adopted as well.

This was a year ago. In its issue of 3rd June 1950 a report-note appears with several letters, one from the world-famous Helen Keller, the blind lady whose vision is as deep as it is correct. The report says that all 71 children have been adopted by *SRL* readers. In addition, other children are receiving beneficence. Mrs. Teiko Yamashita writes:—

Concerning the moral parents no adequate words of thanks can be found in my dictionary. I thank you very much, that is all I can say. From many moral parents in your country come kind and gentle letters in large numbers, and the children are rearing much more pleasantly. When a child hears about his moral parent he writes the name on a card. One boy says smiling, "Mine is in California," while a girl says, "My mother is a music teacher." They are all very proud, with filial heartiness. They put the pictures from America near their beds every night. I feel as relieved as if the proposal of marriage for all my sons and daughters were decided.

The spirit shown by U.S.A. citizens, however limited their number, is a sure expression of the victory of the Allies. Signs of defeat strike our mind's eye more often. It is heartening to see signs of victory; this is one.

SHRAVAKA

4th August 1950.

THE SECULAR STATE OF INDIA

[Below we print two points of view on a topic important not only to India alone but also to the world at large. The first is by one who requires no introduction to our readers, **Shri G. R. Malkani**, Head of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner for many years. His article came to us unsolicited. While its view-point is not ours, THE ARYAN PATH has always welcomed and presented opinions different from those which its conductors hold. We have, however, thought it necessary to secure an article which presents the opposite point of view. **Sir Raghunath P. Paranjpye** writes vigorously as a good free-thinker and rationalist. His view-point deserves to be better known. A Secular State need not be an irreligious State, but the religious State, if it be truly religious, cannot be sectarian. True religion teaches a way of the good life, an intelligent life, a beautiful life of sacrifice and service for all humanity.—ED.]

I.—THE CONCEPT OF THE SECULAR STATE

It is a truism that the state exists for the good of its citizens. This good is not merely physical. Physical values are a means to an end. The end is the cultural development of man, and particularly his spiritual evolution. No man can attain the highest that he is capable of without a modicum of physical comfort and freedom from care. But most often we lose sight of the real goal and destiny of man, and confuse the real good of man with physical values. The means becomes the end itself. Socialism and Communism are mainly responsible for this confusion. They over-emphasize the materialistic aspect of life, and the function of the state in advancing it.

The conception of the secular state often means no more than this socialistic bias. The function of the state is supposed to be the provision of a decent standard of living for its citizens, the elimination of class exploitation, and the ensuring of complete freedom of cultural growth for its racial and religious groups. We shall consider here the last two points of this programme of a secular state.

Class exploitation is natural, and almost normal, in a modern state with its complicated economic structure. We cannot altogether nullify it. Some class or other is bound to dominate other classes and to have, so to say, the whip-hand. We may put down the tyranny of the capitalist; the tyranny of labour will rise in its place, and upset the political balance. Capital, and the enterprise that goes with it, plays an important part in production. If we depress or depreciate this factor, we depress production itself. There is nothing to take its place.

Can the state do so ? Even if it could, it is an impersonal entity. The state has no competition and lacks the profit-motive. It therefore lacks the whole-hearted energy required to make state-undertakings economically successful. This difficulty can only be obviated when all the world becomes socialistic, and there is no competition from other countries with a capitalistic economy. Inefficiency and bad management then merely become universal, and constitute a permanent flaw in the productive machinery of human society as such. If we want to eliminate these drawbacks, we replace the profit motive by the fear motive. We make every one work hard through compulsion and through the application of punitive measures, in order to reach certain targets of production. We have a *managed* economy, which is through-and-through exploitative. This managed economy itself is possible only so long as there are capitalistic nations which have not fallen in line with the socialistic ideal. When the world has been conquered by Communism, even the fear motive will not operate. We shall then have to fall back upon the profit motive once again.

Besides, in a socialistic state, power is concentrated in a few at the top. A new class grows up, the ruling class, which exploits all the rest. We have added political dictatorship to the economic dictatorship. We are not, therefore, very much enamoured of the ideal of removing class exploitation. We can never be completely successful at that. All that the state should do is to see to it that injustice is not done by a privileged few, and that honest work is honestly rewarded. Nationalization or state-ownership is no substitute for moderated and controlled capitalism.

The problem of cultural freedom is peculiar to India among the larger states. The original culture of India was Hindu. But we cannot altogether ignore the exiguous strains of foreign culture due to Muslim and Christian invasions of India. The culture of the rulers has always the backing of political and economic power, and therefore a certain prestige and currency. Is it not time, with our political freedom, that we threw away the alien elements, and reverted to the purity of our own culture ? A mixed culture is the negation of culture. And a synthesis of cultures, if it is to be natural and lasting, does not require to be forced upon an unwilling people through legislative coercion.

A secular state that is completely indifferent to cultural values is not possible. We cannot altogether separate a people's economic problems from their cultural ones. The laws and other institutions of a state are bound to reflect the culture of the people of that state. A purely materialistic interpretation of the function of the state has been attempted by Communism but it has not succeeded, and can never succeed, in keeping the state entirely " neutral " in respect of the culture

and religious ideals of the people. It has only succeeded in substituting another form of culture for one based upon traditional religions and contemptuously called "bourgeois culture."

We cannot, then, altogether separate the cultural bias of a state from its economic and political objectives. A Christian State will have its laws in conformity with the Christian way of life. Similarly a Muslim State or a Hindu State will have its laws in conformity with the Muslim or the Hindu way of life. If we have the so-called purely secular state, we merely give a communistic or materialistic turn to all the policies of the state. If India is not going to be a Hindu State, inspired by the best Hindu tradition and the Hindu way of life, it is going to be a socialistic state whose indifference to culture and to religion is really a veiled form of materialism. The real question is: Should our economics determine our highest ideals, or our highest ideals determine our economics?

The problem is acute in present-day India. Mr. Jinnah well understood the connection between political power and the culture of the people. In a democratic India, with a decided majority of Hindus, Muslim culture, whatever it is, could not be altogether safeguarded. The policies of the state, backed by the majority, were bound to favour Hindu ideas and Hindu ways of life. The British only partially succeeded in remaining neutral. They grafted their own cultural ideas upon the culture of the indigenous people. It was not possible, after they had gone, that the Hindu and the Muslim, with their self-consciousness aroused, would live in amity and would compose all their differences in a spirit of good-will for an indefinite period. There is no room in a state for different cultures which are equally virile and free and which do not intrude upon each other. The culture of the majority, which has effective political power, is bound to succeed in the end, unless it is transformed from within by the superior culture of a political minority. The Islamic way of life could perhaps only be safeguarded in an Islamic State.

But, if that is so, we cannot escape the logic of partitioned India. Has our India a cultural bias or not? If it is not a Hindu bias, it is some other. Those who talk vehemently, and almost religiously, about a secular India are persons who want a socialistic state in preference to a Hindu state, which means that all the values that they really care for are materialistic values. They confuse the means with the end, instrumental and extraneous values with intrinsic values. The latter belong to the development of the higher side of man or his spiritual evolution. We have to choose between materialism and the values of the Spirit. We cannot remain neutral.

Some people argue that there is such a thing as human culture or universal culture. Humanism these

days has become a respectable philosophical theory. It is, however, only a new version of materialism. There is no room in such a view for God, immortality and the higher values of the Spirit, based on a belief in the hereafter. It cannot be the basis of the highest form of culture. Our highest values are religious values. Religion alone sets the goal and the ideals of life. It pervades and colours all the cultural activities of man. Different religious groups can indeed live side by side in a state. But where they equally seek to impress themselves upon public life and manners, enter into a sort of competition for adherents, or organize themselves politically for sectional interests, harmony cannot be maintained. In any case, it means some amount of weakness in the body politic.

A state with no uniform culture, with different groups pulling in different directions and distrusting each other, cannot be a strong state. It will be a house divided against itself. If the inception of Pakistan has any relieving feature, it lies in the new opportunity for achieving uniformity of cultural values in the separated halves. Is it wise or prudent to allow the same old tug-of-war between the two important religious groups in our India ? What is our gain through partition ? Are we, the Hindus, doomed always to remain weak and disunited, by giving common citizenship to persons who considered themselves a separate nation not very long ago, and who still bask in the sunshine of Pakistan's favours and protection ? Shall we not call a halt to this stupid and suicidal policy ?

Hinduism and Islam can never mix well together. The only way different religious groups can come near to each other is through the breaking of social barriers, and particularly through " the mixing of blood " or intermarrying. This is ruled out by the very nature of the Hindu religion, which sets great store by purity of blood and purity of caste. Hinduism, in this respect, is a religion in a class by itself. There is no great barrier between the Jew, the Christian and the Muslim. They have a common religious background, and a more or less common outlook on life. This cannot be said of Hinduism and those religions. Hinduism is not dogmatic or fanatical like them. It is not a religion with a single creed. It tolerates all kinds of differences in creed. It is as wide as the ocean in this respect. Every man can have his own formula and his own creed. But Hinduism does not tolerate freedom in respect of its social structure and its rigidity of caste. This was its strength, which the present rulers consider to be its weakness. However that be, there was no possibility of the Hindu and the Muslim uniting to make one strong nation.

It is not to be wondered at that these two religions, the one militant and the other conscious of its hoary past and its inner strength, could not find points of agreement and of

mutual accommodation. At best they tolerated each other under the pressure of circumstances and external necessity. When the time came, partition became inevitable. But the inevitable consequence of a Hindu state is yet to be realized. Till then, our independence is a make-believe. It does not touch us in our inmost being. We have parted with valuable territory, suffered incalculable losses both material and spiritual, and we still remain weak and divided in our home-land as before. Our sacrifices are in vain. The Hindu India of our aspirations is still a distant goal. The Government is, if anything, even partial to the Muslims and the erstwhile enemies of undivided India.

We have parted company. Why not part in good faith? The Muslims have divided themselves from the rest of India, considering themselves a separate nation. What is left belongs to the Hindus and those who are prepared to live in trust and in friendship with the majority community. Muslims cannot claim this privilege, for if they had this trust, they should not have gone all out for Pakistan. They have lost the good-will of the majority community. The broken glass can never be reunited. Their present declarations of loyalty to India can only be regarded as politic. Other religious groups have nothing to fear from Hinduism, which has never been known to be aggressive and intolerant. We need not, therefore, be chary of calling India a "Hindu State," nor need we, to please certain minorities, call it a secular state. If the minorities do not trust the majority, they have no right to be here. A secular state, carried to its logical conclusion, ought to mean a communistic state.

Hindu India can guarantee all the highest human values. It alone can give that sense of cultural independence and that self-consciousness which is more important than a purely political freedom, which is in any case exercised only by a few at the top. The average man feels no glow of independence. His economic woes are greater than ever before. There is no sphere where he can feel his own importance. The acceptance of the Hindu ideology is bound to inject a new vigour direct into the blood-stream of the nation. It is a glamorous idea that a great Hindu State has at last emerged. It is the only way we can forget for a time our economic woes and feel something of the radiance of independence. Some of our leaders are in the habit of talking and sermonizing about the cultural mission of India. Do they suppose that that mission can be adequately discharged without going to the fountain-head of Hindu philosophy and Hindu religion? They are strangely inept if they think so. Why, then, do they shy at the name "Hindu"?

G. R. MALKANI

II.—SECULAR OR THEOCRATIC ?

I have read Mr. Malkani's article several times and have tried to resist the feeling that all his arguments are coloured by the subconscious impressions naturally created in the mind of a Hindu from Sind by the terrible happenings that attended the partition of India and the sufferings that he and his people had to undergo. It is impossible to explain his specious pleading for the creation of a Hindu State in any other way. In addition to the anti-Muslim background there is another stream of ideas running through his article, that is, his consistent opposition to the socialistic tendencies of modern days. Even this opposition may perhaps be only an indirect manifestation of his anti-Muslim bias, as a large number of prominent Sindhis, who had to leave their homes and abandon their property, belong to the class of capitalists and exploiters whose cause he appears to champion under the guise of advancing spiritual evolution and cultural development.

I do not wish to be unfair to Mr. Malkani, but how can we otherwise account for remarks of his like the following ?—

(1) Class exploitation is natural, and almost normal, in a modern state with its complicated economic structure.

(2) The state has no competition and lacks the profit motive.

(3) We are, therefore, not very much enamoured of the ideal of removing class exploition.

(4) If India is not going to be a Hindu State, inspired by the best Hindu tradition and the Hindu way of life, it is going to be a socialistic state whose indifference to culture and to religion is really a veiled form of materialism.

I am not a Socialist in the esoteric sense of the term but, like most educated men in India, I can see no great future for our country unless we base our economic, social and political policies on broadly socialistic lines. You can abuse these policies by calling them materialistic; you can sneer at them as a new version of Humanism; but the world in general will not rest content with talk about "God, immortality and higher values of the Spirit, based on a belief in the hereafter" if they are necessarily to be accompanied by man-made inequalities, exploitation, grinding poverty and subhuman standards of material existence. In the old days, Christian missionaries in backward lands used to be charged with asking the people to look to Heaven while they and their countrymen filched their lands from them. I am sure that our common people are now sufficiently awake to see that our capitalists, with the assistance of philosophers like Mr. Malkani, do not get away with it by means of a similar trick.

Mr. Malkani insists that Hinduism "does not tolerate freedom in respect of its social structure and its rigidity of caste," and that therefore it cannot have any common ground with

Islam or perhaps also with Christianity, Zoroastrianism or Judaism. This may perhaps have been true in the days of Indian decadence; but in the palmy days of Hindu India other races with their different cultures and outlooks on life were easily absorbed into Hindu society. On account of this we cannot even now exactly define Hindu religion or culture.

What is it that Mr. Malkani means by the Hinduism which he wants to be the foundation of the Hindu State of his imagination instead of the fundamental rights laid down in our Constitution? The first essential in an argument is the proper definition of your terms. I do not think that Mr. Malkani can define his Hinduism in a way which will satisfy everybody in the country, even leaving out the Muslims. Does he expect Sikhs and Jains and Lingayats, Shaivas and Vaishnavas, Brahmins and non-Brahmins of various classes, sects and sub-sects, the Arya Samajists and the Brahmos, the followers of various philosophical systems ranging from downright atheism to the narrowest mysticism, the animists and worshippers of stones, plants, beasts and snakes, all who are broadly called Hindus in the census returns, to agree on a definition of Hinduism? A fresh Constituent Assembly convened to draft the new Constitution of a Hindu India will take so long to agree even on the first article that before they do so we all, including Mr. Malkani, shall have passed away from this world.

Let Hinduism remain in the indefinite, undefined state it is in at present and let us not try to introduce it into our Constitution. Let us, as citizens of a free India, only require our governmental machinery to take care of the mundane and material aspects of our existence —though these also are capable of giving rise to enormous differences of opinion—without expecting it to regulate matters on which there can be no unanimity. The state can at the utmost aspire to ensure for each citizen a reasonable standard of living. The state is a human agency for regulating the relations of its citizens with one another in ordinary social life.

On the so-called spiritual plane the state will necessarily have to remain neutral. If it aspires to regulate matters on this spiritual plane its leaders will have to be church dignitaries, its parliament—if it ever has one—will be concerned not with economic and social questions but with matters of religious doctrine, and its resources will be spent on building temples in the midst of filthy hovels where the citizens will live. This is a prospect which the ordinary citizen will not welcome.

If there is one definite direction in which the political evolution of states is taking place, it is away from the theocratic state. Such states, like Egypt of old, have always remained static and unprogressive. Even temporary exceptions to this

tendency, like Pakistan, will, I am sure, have ere long to reverse their path, just as Turkey did 30 years ago, to the lasting benefit of her citizens.

Mr. Malkani wants us to unlearn the unhappy lessons of our history over the last thousand years and asks, "Is it not time, with our political freedom, that we threw away the alien elements and reverted to the purity of our own culture?" Leaving aside for the moment the question of the existence of a pure Hindu culture, we can ask him, as Ranade asked over 50 years ago, which exactly is the culture he wishes to revive :—

What particular period of our history is to be taken as the old? Whether the period of the Vedas, of the Smritis, of the Puranas, or of the Mohammedan or of the modern Hindu times? Our usages have been changed from time to time by a slow process of growth, and in some cases of decay and corruption, and we cannot stop at a particular time without breaking the continuity of the whole....Shall we revive the 12 forms of sons, or 8 forms of marriage, which included capture, and recognized mixed and illegitimate intercourse? Shall we revive the Niyoga system of procreating sons on our brothers' wives when widowed? Shall we revive the Shakti worship of the left hand with its indecencies and practical debaucheries? Shall we revive the Sati and infanticide customs, or the flinging of living men into the rivers or over the rocks, or hook-swinging, or the crushing beneath Jagannath chariot? Shall we revive the internecine wars of the Brahmins and Kshatriyas, or the cruel persecution and degradation of the aboriginal population? Shall we revive the custom of many husbands to one wife or of many wives to one husband? Shall we require our Brahmins to cease to be landlords and gentlemen and turn into beggars and dependents upon the King as in olden times?

Mr. Malkani wants us to surround ourselves with a new Chinese Wall to keep off any attacks on our culture. But, however much he and others may try, they will not succeed in these days of aeroplanes and radio and atom bombs and the result will be that we shall once more lose our freedom. Other more realistic people will force their ways upon us, and, while we shall be busy with the controversies on doctrinal points inevitable in a theocratic state, they will establish themselves more firmly in our country than the British ever did.

Whatever Mr. Malkani and those who share his views may desire, the political evolution of India will have to be on broadly humanistic and rationalistic lines if she is to remain a great and independent nation. With the innumerable differences already existing in our country on major or minor points of religious practices and doctrines—and it must be remembered that where religion is concerned the most trifling differences generally assume a major importance—any other policy will not be practicable even if desirable. In spite of a certain nostalgic hankering on the part of the ordinary

individual after a more or less imaginary past, it is necessary for every country to look to the present and the future if it is to exist at all. The Prime Minister gave very sound advice in his recent address at Benares when he deprecated too much harping on our past.

Some of us have our own differences of opinion with the present Congress leaders on various questions of political policy and do not praise every action of theirs in season and out of season. But their decision not to follow Mr. Jinnah and the Muslims and make India a theocratic state is one of the wisest things they have done and one which should command the hearty assent of all patriotic Indians. If, in our opinion, Pakistan has made a mistake in basing its polity on the Islamic religion, is it proper for us to follow it in its error? I only hope that our leaders will not be tempted to cajole the unthinking public and to snatch a momentary political advantage by taking part officially in any religious ceremonies, by spending the national resources in building or subsidizing new places of worship for any section of the people, or by introducing religious education in our schools and colleges. The state should consistently regard religion as the private business of the individual and should not mix itself with it except when law and order are involved.

It is possible to agree with those who think that there may be some risk in granting full rights of citizenship to those who in a national emergency may conceivably prove 5th columnists. Mr. Malkani warns us against "giving common citizenship to persons who considered themselves a separate nation not very long ago and who still bask in the sunshine of Pakistan's favours and protection." But the proper way to guard against this danger is not to deny them full rights of citizenship and thus give them a reasonable excuse for their discontent and consequent treasonable activities; that is only the way to confirm them in their anti-national feelings. But if we convince them that they have, in a free and secular India, the fullest opportunities to improve themselves and work out their own future, they will think twice before harbouring any unpatriotic sentiments. The recent return in considerable numbers of Indian Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan in the first flush of partition fervour, or owing to the dread of retaliation, at the hands of Hindus, for Muslim atrocities against Hindus in Pakistan, shows that they realize that they may be better off in a secular India than in a Pakistan under Shariat rule.

The only theoretical way to guard completely against any 5th-column activity on the part of Indian Muslims is to transfer them all to Pakistan. This solution is not at all practicable and might have been thinkable only when partition was brought about; with an Indian Muslim population of something like

40,000,000 it is quite out of the question. All that we can reasonably do to guard against any anti-national activities on their part—and in fact on the part of any religious minority—is to forbid any communal political organizations, to take severe measures against any individual whose loyalty is obviously justly suspect, and to remove all legitimate grievances. If we want India to be a strong and united nation, that strength and unity will have to be based on considerations of this world and not of the world to come.

Anybody who owes loyalty not to India but to any outside government or organization can have only a temporary place in our country; his permanant place is outside India. There may be spiritual sympathy with moral or intellectual movements in other nations, but if that sympathy is so powerful as to override loyalty as an Indian citizen and to endanger the existence of the state, the state is entitled, in my opinion, to take any measures necessary to protect itself.

These remarks have application not only to any Indian Muslims whose love for Islam or for Pakistan may transcend their duty as citizens of this country, but also to any other groups which may harbour similar sentiments. I have in mind some Roman Catholics who may conceivably regard Papal edicts as superior to our national laws, or some Communists who take pride in regarding themselves as Russians rather than as Indians.

In India opinion has always been free and I do not wish this honourable feature of our country to be tarnished by any indulgence in persecution for opinion. But the fundamental principle of national existence holds, for India as for other countries—*Salus populi suprema lex.*

RAGHUNATH P. PARANJPYE

SHAKESPEAREANA

The Shakespeare Association of America, Inc., at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, has started publishing a very interesting Quarterly, the first two numbers of which have been received at the Indian Institute of Culture in Bangalore. Both these issues are full of information of value to all students and lovers of the great Dramatist. In the second number appears "Shakespeare: An Annotated Bibliography for 1949," edited by Sidney Thomas, which will prove of great help. Here in India too we have so many ardent lovers of Shakespeare that we should like to draw their pertinent attention to this excellent new American Quarterly.

THE NEGRO AND WORLD PROGRESS

[**Mr. William A. Rutherford** was born in Chicago, educated at the University of California, began his career as a reporter and is now working on a novel of the life of the Negro artist in America. He has served as a special consultant to UNESCO, Press Section, and is interested in colonial territories.—ED.]

It is often said, and agreed to by most, that the foundations of peace rest in the minds of men. It seems to me to be as undeniably true that the progress of the world can be measured by the physical and moral condition of man. The title of this article might be, as I suspect my editor thought it was, The Negro *in* World Progress. As we shall see, however, the slight difference in terms covers the rather large realms of two quite different subjects.

On the one hand it is a question of world progress in a number of spheres such as science, economics, literature, philosophy, religion, etc. from one state to another. The record of the different problems which have faced and face mankind, and the solutions with which it has answered them. In this respect the subject of The Negro *in* World Progress would naturally embrace members of this group, such as the famous scientist, George Washington Carver, and perhaps the more obscure 18th-century Negro slave and almanac maker, Benjamin Banneker, and a host of others, including contemporary American Negroes such as Ralph Bunche and W. E. B. Du Bois, and their contributions to humanity in all the many spheres of human endeavour.

On the other hand, however, that of The Negro *and* World Progress, no such record of glorious achievement and contribution exists. If the postulate can be accepted that the condition and plight of men is an index of world or human progress, then from the point of view of the Negro—and the world—little or no progress can be recorded. In the disordered world of today, such progress must be made and recorded while there is the possibility of making it and a chronicler still alive to note it.

This generation might look with pride and satisfaction upon the strides that man—black, white, yellow, brown—has made during the past decade: the achievement of freedom and national independence by millions of people; the mechanical and technological developments and innovations which theoretically enrich all mankind; the organized campaigns against illiteracy and ignorance; the discoveries in medicine and chemistry which can overcome heretofore invincible maladies; the tiny steps that have been taken in some countries towards a more social—equal—distribution of common goods; the increasing international movement of national cultures, evinced by the interest, in almost

all countries, in the literature and art of other countries. These things, and many more, might be looked upon with pride and satisfaction. But if the scrutiny of man's progress was thorough enough—or made by a Negro—the look of pride and satisfaction would become one of shame and disgust—and perhaps of anger.

Of the millions of people in the world today who still live under the brutality and assorted horrors of racial or national subjugation, the majority are Negro. In a world where there is supposedly a growing literacy rate, stands Africa—99% illiterate. Under the eyes of the 20th-century gods, Freedom and Justice, black men are lynched and murdered legally—without trial,—starved and forced to work without pay, and are hated for being weak. Technological advancement can mean little to them when their first thought is bread. Medical discoveries are of no interest, even in the most diseased parts of the world, when they have no doctors and schools refuse to train them because their faces are black.

It is not good to think of these things when contemplating world progress, yet they are a part of it. For how long have these things been true?—How much progress has been made towards changing them?—Then how fast are we progressing? It is difficult for a Negro to think of "world progress" and not be bitter. For if there has been progress in the world in the complete sense, *ergo*, he is not a part of that world, for he has known little or none.

It goes beyond the limits of our credulity to argue here the basic equality of men. And it would seem to be as obvious that, men being equal, it is impossible to have world progress without it being progress for the *whole* world. Consider the impossibility of a unit with one part of it going forward and another part standing still or going backward. Recalling our topic: The Negro and World Progress (as opposed to The Negro in World Progress), some might think that our treatment had slighted the subject. After all we are only a few thousand years old, and we—including the Negro—have made *some* progress. But we would do well to remember that progress can only be real when it is universal and equal. And that, until it becomes so, we are faced, sooner or later, with an explosion which will leave our "progress" in ashes. *There are hundreds of millions of people whose situation has been getting worse instead of better for the last four hundred years. They have known no progress.*

The key to the desires and needs of our times, peace, security, freedom from fear and want, lie in that often used but seldom understood expression: Equality. And until we achieve this, progress, in terms of the world, will be a highly academic and nebulous question, and one likely to blow up in our faces at any moment.

WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD

THE MAORIS OF NEW ZEALAND

HOW THE COLOUR-BAR WAS ABOLISHED

[**John J. Alderson's** article brings a hope to a despairing world. It shows how a very difficult problem was solved in New Zealand, as it has been solved in Brazil.—ED.]

In a world torn by race and colour discriminations, New Zealand can draw herself up proudly, and say, "We have none." For it is in this country that the white man and the brown man have complete equality —except in a few respects where the Maori possesses a few privileges the *paheha*, as he is called, does not. But this is, or was, due to the unhappy curse of party politics, and the very fact that the Maoris became a privileged class is more or less complete proof that they are one with the white man. For the working man, and farmers, and even store-keepers are not immune from this sectional interest by politicians.

Where did the Maoris come from ? They have a history, probably as authentic as our own, and it well deserves notice. For they are an enlightened part of an awakening world.

We can start about the time the Angles were invading Britain. But we are not too sure that they did—such is the trustworthiness of our own history! Yet the Maori can trace his genealogy back, in some cases almost to the Flood. They were poetical; all great peoples are; and when we brush aside the poetry, we find the solid backbone of history giving tradition and myth the rigidity and permanence that have made them capable of remaining so long.

Probably the first man to see New Zealand, as far as the Maoris were concerned, was Maui, who incidentally relates that it was inhabited. Maui lived in Indonesia about 125 A.D. and many a Maori can trace his genealogy back to him. Many of them claim they should not be called Maoris, but after Maui.

But this explorer, in his great wooden canoe sailed eastward to either the New Hebrides or New Caledonia, then turned southward until he at last encountered the warm current from the Great Australian Bight, then turned east. One day the watch cried that land was ahead, but Maui, weary with travelling, replied sceptically, "*He tiritiri-o-te-moana*" which is, "A mirage of the ocean." But it was land, the Southern Alps of New Zealand, and it was thus that this part of the country became known as "Tiritiri-o-te-moana."

Maui and his crew sailed around the island, landing and exploring in various places, until at length they landed near the Kaikouris, and upon climbing these beheld the North Island across the strait. Here is a

good example of the poetry of the Maori. The legends say he fished up New Zealand, while what he did was to see it from the peak of a mountain. And I suggest that many another fish story has less truth in it.

Finally, in the northern extremity of the North Island, he left some of his party, but it is unknown how they fared. A grandson of one of the crew returned there two generations later. Nuku-tawhiti settled in this same district 500 or 600 years later.

Meanwhile the Polynesian race was spreading over the islands of the Pacific Ocean. The Maori branch settled in the Society Islands, where they married and multiplied to disastrous proportions.

But Kupe, still a wanderer, set out in his wooden canoe for the "land of the sunset," following the flight of the long-tailed cuckoo, or *kockoea* as the Maoris called it. The wife of Kupe, for these explorers took the wise precaution of taking their wives with them, seeing the white cliffs of New Zealand, cried, "He ao!" or "A cloud." But soon they saw that it was land, so they called it "Aotearoa" or "Land of the Long White Cloud."

This country they discovered was very fertile, and abounding in food. So upon returning home they left careful directions as to how to reach it.

Meanwhile another branch of the Polynesian race was seeking a new home, having been forced, it is believed, out of Asia. These were the Morioris, and they took over New Zealand, and were there until the arrival of the Maoris made short work of them.

The next visit was by Toi. A huge regatta had taken place at Tahiti, and, to end the day, Whatonga his grandson, who had been very successful at the sports, invited the chief, Te Rahui, to a race to the open sea. But a fog came down, and the canoes did not return. Toi set out after many days, to search for Whatonga. He found Te Rahui but of his grandson there were no tidings. After much sailing, he reached New Zealand near Auckland, but, receiving no news of Whatonga, he sailed down to Whakatane and, wearied with searching, settled down amongst the inhabitants. Whatonga was safe and was soon in search of Toi. In a great canoe, with a crew of 60, and accompanied by their wives, he landed in New Zealand, and learning of Toi on the other side of the island, paddled around. He too, settled among the natives.

But the Maoris in the Society Islands had fallen on evil days. Many were the men, but little was the food to support them. They had reached the stage where many a country in the world is now. War, robbery and plunder were rampant, for the islands could not support the population. The wise old elders met, and decided upon emigration as the solution to their problem. The great double canoes were built, and provisioned, and the emigrants were about to set out for the almost

legendary land of Kupe—the land of milk and honey.

The great day dawned, and the huge canoes were loaded in the tropical harbour. They were about to leave when the voice of the old priest whom they all loved, fell upon their ears with his last and solemn warning "Follow not after the god of war in your new country of the south; hold to the deeds of Rango the Peaceful."

It was about Christmas time in the year 1350 that these immigrants landed in New Zealand, for the brief-flowering scarlet pohutukawa was in blossom. New Zealand was divided between them, and never again need they fear famine, and never again need they fear war.

But clan feeling was strong, very strong, as among the Celts of the Scottish Highlands; the similarity between the two races was amazing. The Maori lived for war, and his fortified village was built on a hill, which was terraced for a stockade. Today, almost every hill in northern New Zealand is terraced, mute evidence of the many battles between the different tribes.

But war was a thing of honour, and to take advantage of an opponent, unless it was strictly a military matter, would not be countenanced. For instance, they never prevented each other from obtaining food or water, for how, they would demand, could a man fight without these?

But a sadder story opened. One of the Chiefs realized the value of muskets. He came to Britain, was loaded with presents, and went to Sydney selling his presents and buying muskets. Armed with these the Nagaputi tribe swept southward, and in a few bloody years one quarter of the population had been wiped out. Vast areas were laid waste, villages burnt and cultivated patches ruined. They were cannibals, and ate the slain. The Chief responsible finally died with a bullet through his lung.

The Rauparaha of Cook Strait began a similar bloody career. This was a little over a century ago. The north part of the South Island, and the south part of the North Island were prostrate before him. Entire tribes were exterminated. He also was a cannibal, but this man became a Christian, and took Christianity to the tribes he once had fought.

Christianity took root, and the Maori was taught agriculture and useful arts. He became happy and prosperous, and lived on the best of terms with his white friends.

But a depression set in and the Maoris of the north declared it was because the Government had placed a flagpole at the head of the harbour of Russel, and this kept ships out. The result was that one of these Chiefs, Hone Heke, cut this flagstaff down, and the Government foolishly sent troops to deal with him. This began a story of sad carnage, in which the British lost many soldiers, while the loyal natives were debauched by the licentiousness of

the soldiers. Hone was eventually pardoned.

This was merely the first flicker of the revolt that was to sweep the country. Tribe after tribe rose, for now they were patriots—they were fighting for their country. They were to fight until they had driven the white man into the sea. Imperial troops, Australian troops, and a local militia were used to save the settlers from death and exile. But now there was no cannibalism. The Maori buried the dead with full military honours, for the missionaries had shown them something greater.

It was an unequal battle, and the Maori was finally broken, and dispossessed of much of his land. His ancient laws, his tribal lands, were destroyed, and his national spirit was broken.

Together with this the loyal natives suffered from contact with the evil-living troops. Gum-digging and gold-mining were "get rich quick" occupations that took the Maoris from their agriculture. When these were finished they sat down, a broken race, under the rule of another, and with no wish to live, they began to die. In a few short and terrible years, the population fell by 50 per cent.

The *paheha* respected the Maori too much to let this go on, and wanted to know what was wrong. Inquiries were held. The Government announced that the Maori was a British subject, with full equality with the whites, and entitled to the full benefits of their civilization. Sir Donald Maclean marched into their midst and told them this. He told them that their confiscated lands were returned, that loans were available for those who wanted to build up their farms, and that they could enter professions beside the white man. The Maori could not understand it—he could hardly believe it, but he rallied. He proved to the *paheha* that he was correct in believing that the Maori was his equal. Fifty years before the women of Britain had a vote, the Maoris were returning their own members to the New Zealand Parliament. One of them, Sir James Carrol became Prime Minister. The pride and respect of the old Maori is returning,—already their population has returned to the pre-white level, and is still increasing. It is the new Maori, the white Man's equal, that has arisen, a man who loves his fellow-man.

There are problems that remain, but they can and will be solved. Nor should the solving of them be difficult, for the Maori is not a problem to New Zealand, but part, an essential part, of the community.

Surely here is a message to a despairing and strife-torn world. If two peoples have thrown in their lot together for all time, then surely it is possible for other peoples to follow in their footsteps.

JOHN J. ALDERSON

RIDDLE-POETRY IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

[**Shri H. G. Narahari, M.A., M. Litt.,** writes here on an interesting theme interestingly. Reading the riddle is a lively sport and often valuable.—ED.]

Nowadays there is hardly a single standard newspaper or popular periodical that has not a section in it devoted to riddles or some sort of "brain-testers." The value of the conundrum which is at once an entertainer and an educator is never exaggerated. As it attracts the tired brain of the adult, so does it absorb the attention of the inquisitive mind of the youngster. Both find it a pleasant diversion, but both benefit immensely thereby, however unconscious they may be of the benefit at the time. The youngster is introduced to the idioms and intricacies of the language in the most congenial way; and he may well prefer this method, which is certainly exacting, to any other. As an old Sanskrit adage goes: Of two drugs, equally efficient but one sweet and the other bitter, the patient knows which to choose. And the adult may acquire in the course of his diversion, albeit unconsciously, much knowledge which he might not be able to pursue in his normal moments. The riddle is really one of the most charming methods of instruction ever invented by man: it gives relaxation to the tired mind and keys up the one which is untrained.

Yet this literary pastime is no new invention of our own times. Abundant also in old German literature, this appears to be one among our many precious legacies from the Indo-European period. In India it goes back to Vedic times when it was a very popular diversion. Sacrifices were then the rule of the day, and riddle-games and questions were the favourite recourse of priests who officiated at elaborate sacrifices like that of the horse (*aśvamedha*), as an efficient means to derive relief from the tedium of sitting for long hours or for several days together as occasion demanded. These are known as *brahmodyas* and the three Vedas, the *Rig*, the *Yajus* and the *Atharva*, are full of them. Some of the riddles strike us as simple, nay, even juvenile. The following dialogue from the *Vājaṣaneyi Saṁhitā* (XXIII. 45) which gives both the query and the reply may be cited as an instance :—

> "Who wanders lonely on his way ?
> Who is constantly born anew ?
> What is the remedy for cold ?
> What is the great corn-vessel called ?"

> "The sun wanders lonely on his way,
> The moon is constantly born anew,
> Fire is the remedy for cold,
> The earth is the great corn-vessel."

Often brief descriptions of the characteristics of individual gods are given, and we are to guess the names. In the following verses from the *Rigveda* (VIII. 29), for instance,

it is the Vedic gods Soma, Indra, Puṣan and the Aśvins that are meant :—

One is a youth brown, active, manifold: he decks the golden one with ornament.
Another holds the thunderbolt, wherewith he slays the Vritras resting in his hand.
Another, thief-like, watches well the ways, and knows the places where the treasures lie.
Two with one Dame ride on with winged steeds, and journey forth like travellers on their way.

The really difficult riddles are those that are symbolic and mystic in character and are intended to drill the mind in the many and involved details concerning the cult of sacrifice. One hymn of the *Rigveda* (I. 164) is so full of these, some almost unintelligible, that it is famous as the "Riddle Hymn." The following verse from this hymn yields to more than one interpretation :—

Seven to one-wheeled chariot yoke the courser; bearing seven names the single courser draws it.
Three-naved the wheel is, sound and undecaying, whereon are resting all these worlds of being.

More terse are some of the *Kuntāpa* hymns of the *Atharvaveda*, of which the following (XX.133.1) is a sample :—

Two rays of light are lengthened out, and the man gently touches them with the two beatings on the drum.
Maiden, it truly is not so as thou, O maiden, fanciest.
Two are thy mother's rays of light : the skin is guarded from the man.

What exactly is meant by this verse or the remaining five which constitute the hymn is by no means clear. It is in recognition of this that the entire hymn is traditionally called an enigma (*pravalhikā*). Its very value appears to lie in its obscurity. The gods, we are told, recited the hymn to bewilder their natural enemies, the demons, who could make nothing out of it; and sacrificers who would similarly confuse their adversaries are advised to adopt the formula.

In the *Mahābhārata* the prospect of Yudhisthira's brothers' rallying back to consciousness depends essentially upon how satisfactorily the eldest of the Pāṇḍavas can solve the conundrums set to him by the Yakṣa. The dialogue between the two covers practically the entire range of Indian Ethics; but some of the questions are undeniably "brain-testers" and call for pluck rather than profundity, mental alertness rather than depth of learning, on the part of him who has to meet them. The Yakṣa asks :—

"What is that which doth not close its eyes while asleep? What is that which doth not move after birth? What is that which is without heart? And what is that which swells with its own impetus?

Who is truly happy? What is most wonderful? What is the path? What is the news? Answer these four questions of mine and let thy dead brothers revive!"

Yudhiṣṭhira replies :—

"A fish doth not close its eyes while asleep; an egg doth not move after birth; a stone is without heart; and a river swelleth with its own impetus."

"He who cooks his mess of vegetables at the eighth watch of the day, and he who is not in debt, and is not a

sojourner, he, O Water-Goblin, is happy.

"That, while every day created things are hastening to the hall of death, others should say, 'I wish to remain,' —what is more wonderful than this?

"The Scriptures are at variance and Holy Writ is at variance; many are the Seers (*Ṛṣi*), but their advice is at variance; the essence of virtue is placed in the inner recesses (of the heart), and that along which the great and good have gone before—that is the path.

"In this cauldron (of the world) full of illusion, time cooks created things, with the sun for fire, night and day for fuel, and months and seasons for the stirring ladle,—this is the news."

In the Classical Period the riddle, now known as the *prahelikā*, was a recognized species of poetic composition. It was quite a popular mode of figurative expression and was the subject of specialized treatises like the *Vidagdhamukhamaṇḍana* and the *Durghaṭakāvya*. The famous prose-writer Bāṇa would have it that the riddle is a useful amusement worthy even of kings. As many as 30 varieties of riddles are recorded, 16 of them dignified and useful and the remaining ones vulgar and undesirable (*duṣṭa*). Both the question and the answer are contained in the following half-verse:—

kani nikṛttani katham kadalivanavasina svayam tena

(By him who lived in the plantain-grove what were cut and how?)

By another method of splitting the compounds the same line gives the following answer:—

Like a plantain tree nine of his heads were cut by himself with a sword.

Normally read, the following verse gives an absurd meaning:—

Asitaih kundakusumais sitais campaka-puspakaih
Vasudevalayam gatva candrasekharam arcaya

(With jasmine blossoms that are not white and *campaka* flowers that are white, go to the temple of Vāsudeva and worship Candraśekhara.)

There is no jasmine blossom that is not white and no *campaka* that is. And it is impossible to go to a temple consecrated to Viṣṇu and worship Śiva there.

In the first half of the verse the pun is on the word *sita* which means both "white" and "woven into a garland"; and in the second half the compound *vāsudevālayam* must be split into *vāsu* and *devālayam*, *vāsu* taken to be in the vocative singular, being an address to the man of that name. The verse can thereafter be intelligibly rendered thus:—

With jasmine blossoms that are not woven into a garland and with *campaka* flowers that are so woven, O Vāsu, go to the temple and offer worship to Candraśekhara.

Early writers on Poetics like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin would accord quite a high place to this type of poetry. The *prahelikā* is to them a serious kind of composition full of varied root-meanings and verbal tricks like paronomasia. But in the view of later writers like Ānandavardhana, to whom poetry is impossible without *Rasa*, this and other kinds of artistic (*citra*) composition lose their importance. Concerning the exact status that can be accorded to this class of poetry rhetoricians may sharply disagree; but there appears to be complete unanimity of opinion among them in looking upon it as a lively and highly educative literary sport.

H. G. NARAHARI

INDIA WILL TEACH THE WEST

[**Dr. John E. Owen,** born in England but long resident in the U.S.A. and now Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Ohio, develops here a hope which many in the West entertain. Whether it be attributed to the gems of ancient Indian thought now available to the West in translation, to the influence of the Theosophical Movement in our century, to the life and teachings of Gandhiji, or to whatever else, the hope is there in not a few that India may lead the nations out of the wilderness of materialism and mutual antagonism into the Promised Land of peace and unity and aspiration towards the higher things of life. The opportunity for a constructive contribution is unparalleled, but is India ready to make it? Unless she *leads* the way, not only points to it, the world will not be slow to cry, "Physician, heal thyself!" The mentality of educated India differs little from that of the West; the unlettered village millions are inarticulate; there are a handful in India who have both vision and opportunities for the great enterprise.—ED.]

Western civilization may be compared with a hypochondriac who is forever taking his own temperature. No type of literature is more popular today than that which would tell us where we stand and where we are going. Hegel reminded us that when any civilization began to speculate about itself it was on the decline, and in more recent decades several responsible thinkers have called in question the continued existence of Western culture itself. Certain it is that contemporary Western thought shows more confusion and inconsistency than at any time in the past half-century. And that the present condition of Europe is not a mere war aftermath, but the symptom of a far-reaching crisis in human culture, is not doubted by any reputable social scientist or religious philosopher. To all but the extremely superficial it is apparent that two world wars in one generation are indicative of a deep-seated malady.

No less renowned a thinker than Professor Pitirim Sorokin of Harvard University makes the claim that the "sensate culture" of the West is doomed and that only a return to a more spiritual or "ideational" culture can save man from an impending and inevitable holocaust.[1] Spengler was not the only prophet of doom, it would appear. The years since the publication of *The Decline of the West* have witnessed the expression of similar forebodings. The materialism of Western culture has in particular been the frequent topic for social analysis and dire prediction from pulpit, press and lecture platform.

Western thought has reflected the sensate and materialistic trend *par*

[1] *The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook.* By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., New York. 1942.)

excellence. The influence of the natural sciences upon philosophy has been profound, and much modern philosophy is little more than the philosophy of science. Behaviourism, materialism, naturalism, mechanism and, finally, logical positivism are the intellectual consequences of the trend of scientific development that began with the discoveries of the 16th and 17th centuries. Under the later onslaught of ethical relativism and scientific materialism, long-held positions in philosophy and religion have been abandoned and the void of belief has not been satisfactorily filled.

A mechanistic materialism is the implicit philosophy of thousands in Western countries today. It could not be claimed for its adherents that they have all penetrated very deeply into the philosophical assumptions underlying this outlook on life. Few minds, even among the professional scientists, have paid much attention to the naturalistic presuppositions and implications of the sciences. But the materialistic world-view of the natural sciences, their raw empiricism and thoroughgoing naturalism have " taken the field " in vast areas of thought. The very word " scientific " has become almost a fetish with many. Science, it is maintained, holds the key to truth, and the scientist is regarded with practically the same veneration and superstitious awe that the primitive showed to the witch-doctor or the medicine-man.

The more philosophically sophisticated of the scientists have recognized the limitations of science as a philosophy, and they have pointed out the inadequacy of the mathematical-physical interpretation of life and mind. A. N. Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*, Sir James Jeans's *Physics and Philosophy*, Lecomte du Noüy's *Human Destiny*, and the profound but humble utterances of Professor Albert Einstein all point to this trend. But these names are rare in the roster of Western science and for every philosopher who examines mechanistic materialism there are ten scientists who fail to question its presuppositions, while there are hundreds of lay minds who uncritically accept this creed.

In religion there may be observed a similar tendency, namely, a widespread failure to think through to the ultimate ethical implications of religious beliefs, and the failure to relate these beliefs to problems of personal and group relations. A general decay of religious faith, ably described by Walter Lippmann[1] and others, is so well-known as to need no comment. The neglect of the humanitarian and ethical aspects of religion has been very far-reaching in its social and political consequences. Western Christianity has made little critical examination of moral experience. The results of moral illiteracy in human history

[1] *A Preface to Morals*. By WALTER LIPPMANN. (The Macmillan Company, New York. 1929.)

make dismal reading. "Man's inhumanity to man" has shown itself with tragic clearness in recent years. The "dignity of man" has a hollow sound when one recalls world events since September 3, 1939. And it could hardly be claimed that organized religion in the West has been an effective force either on behalf of world peace or humanitarian endeavour.

In similar vein, recent Western thought shows a jumbled conglomeration of conflicting philosophies, from the ethically arid wastes of logical positivism to the maze of existentialism, from Protestant Fundamentalism to "New Thought." And in human relations, as in ideas, conflict appears to be the dominant key-note. Jew and Arab, Gentile and Jew, Catholic and Protestant, Negro and white, capital and labour, are but a few of the more obvious areas of strife that come readily to mind in any cursory glance at Europe and America today. And over all hangs the struggle between the political absolutism of Russia and the democratic concepts of Western lands.

Many in the West have come to believe that perhaps India will ultimately offer a way out of the present morass. Certain it is that India will become ever more important in future decades and will play a larger rôle in world affairs. Professor F.S.C. Northrop of Yale University, in a book[1] that has been described as "perhaps the greatest intellectual event of the twentieth century," writes of the coming together of cultures and of India's possibilities for leading men out of the dark night that surrounds them. The title of this work, *The Meeting of East and West*, is significant.

From England comes a similar thought. Dean W. R. Inge, the erstwhile "gloomy Dean" of St. Paul's, London, sees a ray of hope in India. History, he says, shows that progress usually follows from the fusion of two cultures. History also shows that religions, and revivals of religions, are born in the East, and some exotic influence may have to be felt before new life flows into our institutions. Some have believed that Russia may be our missionary. But, he asks, is Russia the most easterly section of Europe or the most westerly of Asia? "*Perhaps a more likely source of inspiration is India.*" (Italics mine) Christianity in its original and purest expression was an Eastern religion; it contained elements which have been largely neglected in Northern Europe and America. Dean Inge concludes that the "influence of a new marriage of East and West would probably be good for both."[2]

Such a cultural blending may seem remote to many. But three British thinkers, now in America, also point

[1] *The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding*, By F. S. C. NORTHROP. (The Macmillan Company, New York. 1946.)

[2] *What Kind of a Future?* By W. R. INGE. (*The Fortnightly*, Vol. CLVIII, p. 291, November, 1945)

to what may be a significant trend in future decades. A dissatisfaction with organized Christianity is typical of many intellectuals, and Aldous Huxley, Christopher Isherwood, and Gerald Heard represent a growing phenomenon in the West. All three are now devoted adherents of the Vedanta Temple in Hollywood, California. It is ironic, but noteworthy, that Hollywood, symbol of the crass materialism of "sensate culture," should be the scene for such a wistful turning to the East. There are signs that many, not content with mere secularism yet repelled from orthodox Christianity, are finding in the religions of India the fulfilment of their needs.

The trend of cultural fusion and religious evolution, like all great creative processes, will take a long time. In recent decades the religion of the West has done little more than sanctify, rather than redeem, the social and economic injustices of an order of life based upon conflict between nations, races and classes, a conflict which has dragged Europe down to inhuman depths. The Western world stands desperately in need of an ethical religion of humanity. And to us in the West, India is the land of religion, the "god-infested land," as America is the dollar-infested land.

American capital and technology are raising India's standard of living. It may well be that India's philosophy and religion will raise America's standard of life. Indeed, is it premature to hope, as many thinkers and scholars here are hoping, that in the religion of India the West may find itself in devotion to higher and more enduring values than those of individualism, scientific materialism and political absolutism? Is it too much to hope that the day will come when the international and cultural conflicts of the West will be creatively resolved in the humanitarian-ethical inclusiveness of the East?

Western civilization has replaced the ethics of the tribe with the ethics of the nation, class, and race. Future historians may record that India taught the West to replace such group distinctions with the ethics of humanity. Some of us in the West, and our number is increasing, believe that India has much to teach us in religion and in life. But can we learn in time?

JOHN E. OWEN

THE IDEAL WOMAN OF FUTURE INDIA

[Believing with Abraham Lincoln that "the home is the corner stone of our civilization, the source of our strength and glory," we welcome this contribution by **Shri M. S. Ananthapadmanabha Rao** to the basic problem of woman's functions, rights and status. The family is not only, as he brings out, the unit of the nation; it offers also the pattern for the building of the state. It is on mutual respect and affection and mutual recognition of the interdependence of man and woman that ideal homes can be built. Such homes are centres of spiritual influence, giving dignity and grace to life, the natural flowering of which is marital fidelity, parental protection and filial piety. Happy the man and woman who, following the Path of Duties rather than of Rights, succeed in building such a spiritual home! Happy the children who grow up in its pure atmosphere of temperate and ordered living and of sacrificial love!—ED.]

Now that India has become a full-fledged Republic, we are in a position to determine what place women should occupy in future India. In so doing, we are studying, with much care, her past and present status, so that the ideal may not be merely utopian. Varied and divergent are the opinions expressed, of course not systematically, as to her position. One dominant view is that man has sufficiently dominated over woman and that it is high time that she should set herself on a par with him, if not rule him. Diametrically opposed to this theory we have also the view that for women the home is everything and that she is properly dependent on her husband. A careful examination of these views will enable us to put the Indian woman of future India in her true place.

We may start with a consideration of the position of women in ancient India from the points of view of family, marriage, divorce, etc. We may safely say that in those times the Indian woman occupied a proper place. In the family life, she enjoyed honour and affection. She was considered the centre of household activity. Husband and wife were like the two wheels of a cart. She was the keystone of the arch of happiness. A home without a wife was considered a wilderness. The management of her household and the educating of her children formed her primary duties.

Matrimony in ancient India was more a sacred ceremony than a business contract. An unmarried person was considered unholy, and marriage was made obligatory. *Grahastya* was a necessary and important stage or *Asrama* in a man's life. Monogamy was the ideal. Infant marriages were generally unknown. The age of marriage for brides was between 16 and 18, by which time they should have reached maturity. The present rigid dowry system was unknown; the dowry was a voluntary gift of

pure affection, the need for making which was no impediment in the way of marriage. The idea of divorce rarely occurred to the ancient Indians, their conception of marriage being such, and if there was divorce at all it served only as the last resort. The custom of levirate existed and the remarriage of young widows was otherwise allowed.

The religious status of women was identical with that of men and no sacrifice conducted by a man without his wife was considered valid. Women were permitted to study the sacred texts. We know that Atreyi was studying under Valmiki with Lava and Kusa. It can therefore be said that in ancient India the community as a whole was showing proper concern and respect for womankind.

In the middle ages we observe a gradual deterioration in the position of woman. Child marriage appeared. Concubinage spread considerably in society. Society refused to admit captured women. Purdah came into vogue. Woman was looked upon as a domestic drudge and an instrument for the satisfaction of sexual appetite. Politically, legally and socially woman had no existence. The orthodox treatment of widows was one of horror.

Thus we see in the course of history a departure from the normal position which woman had enjoyed in the Vedic times. The pendulum of history swung to one extreme when woman was made a domestic drudge. It is but natural that it should now be swinging to the other, as we observe happening in Western countries.

The industrial revolution created a revolution in the relationship of man and woman, by effecting her economic emancipation. There is coming into being a more liberal view of sexual morality, which has disturbed rather violently the equilibrium of the family. Today, life is no longer centred in and around the home; it has moved to the factory, the club and the office. Matrimony is getting to mean a mere matter of convenience and, as in commerce, a contract is entered into. The slogan of "right to divorce" is being raised. Woman is claiming equal rights in all walks of life.

Through a critical examination of these extreme views—one asserting that the right place of woman is the home and that her proper status is dependence and the other claiming for her unrestrained and unchecked liberty—then, we shall find our solution to the problem.

As we can see at the very outset, the orthodox view of the status of Hindu women is highly conservative and narrow. It would be nothing but sheer social injustice to advocate it. It represents a grim picture of life, making woman a handmaid of man's passions. Child marriage was only necessitated by the disturbed conditions once prevailing, and now it is out of date. The severe restraint placed on the remarriage of young widows has resulted in prostitution. Woman secluded in

purdah became the victim of many diseases. But while we are exposing these defects of the orthodox view, we are not blind to its value in insisting on woman's not neglecting her domestic duties.

The modern view rightly emphasizes the point that woman is an individual, and not a domestic animal. But the modern view early landed in peril when it neglected the idea of the home. Woman, absorbed in the claiming of rights, has become negligent of her duties. Today social and civic agencies, in taking over most of the parental responsibility, have deprived the parents of an important bond of mutual understanding. In every sphere of participation between husband and wife, life is becoming so mechanical that it is intellectually and spiritually barren; and sympathies which might have been deep and fruitful are rendered void.

We see the existence of the family at stake. The family is the unit of a nation; only by perfecting this unit and restoring true, strong family life, can we hope to stabilize the nation and put it on the road to progress; not by making the State take over the functions of the family. This is an unnatural encroachment, for the State can neither take the place of the family nor do without it.

The modern system of education leaves woman unfitted for family life. Home training is conspicuous by its absence. She runs to doctors for ordinary ailments. She knows little or nothing of child care, of nutritious food, kitchen or garden. The education of woman can be useful only when it is related to home life and due attention is paid to the cultivation and development of woman's physical and moral as well as intellectual aspects. No undue importance should be attached to university degrees.

Women in industry and public work create a fresh problem. The sex impulse is a predominant propensity in human beings. Where men and women mingle freely there is quite possibly a weakening of moral integrity. The right to divorce accentuates the desire to seek fresh mates. Promiscuity spreads venereal disease, which has been reported on the increase in several Western countries, *e.g.*, America, England, Ireland, Denmark and Switzerland. If there are evils in the system of marriage, sanity lies in reforming the institution of marriage and not in creating further evils to remedy evil, which will end only in a chain of evils.

Woman's claim to equal rights with man in all walks of life is due to her ignorance of her biological status. The differences between man and woman are more fundamental than is generally recognized. Dr. Alexis Carrel was of the opinion that these differences extend to the very structure of the tissues. By the impregnation of the entire organism with specific chemical substances, every cell of the woman's body bears the "mark" of her sex. Ignorance of these facts has led the promoters of

feminism to believe that both sexes should have the same education, the same powers and the same responsibilities.

It strikes us that the ideal woman of future India must be a fine reconciliation and a happy blend of the two extreme views:—the conservative and the liberal. Education is the most important factor by which we can rightly shape the ideal woman. Motherhood has long been the cherished ideal of woman. The ideal home, of which the ideal woman is the centre, is an earthly paradise, where there is perfect mutual understanding between the two partners without any feeling in either of superiority or inferiority. She takes care of the family and the children. She is well informed on all her country's affairs and is entitled to give her expert advice, for receiving which the country should provide the necessary channels. Her right to property must be recognized. Monogamy should be the ideal and divorce the last resort. The marriage of young widows should be encouraged and women bereft of homes should serve as teachers and nurses. The State should take care of the women who are unfit to do any work.

The promotion of this ideal would require as much change in Indian economic, political and social spheres, as in the present-day status of women itself. Once the ideal was achieved, India would stand out among the nations. She would take pride in achieving a juster status for women and proclaim to the world the level of civilization she had attained, the spiritual advancement she had made. Assimilating the historic glory of her past, mindful of the revolutionary changes of the present, she would move on with dignity, adjusting her attitude as the changes wrought by time make necessary, thus attaining a position culturally unique and offering a model for the world at large.

M. S. ANANTHAPADMANABHA RAO

A woman's rank
Lies in the fullness of her womanhood;
Therein alone she is royal.

—GEORGE ELIOT

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

OUSPENSKY AND GURDJIEFF

I *

In the early 1920's we heard rumours of a mysterious "Russian" named Gurdjieff who had founded a philosophical school near Fontainebleau. We understood that A. R. Orage, a brilliant editor, had given up everything to join it and that Katherine Mansfield, the writer of subtle short stories, had died there. We did not know that P. D. Ouspensky was also a disciple of this guru, although the former's metaphysical books had already brought him a considerable reputation.

The title of his last book is misleading. Many persons might assume that it was a treatise on table-tipping and similar elementary psychic phenomena. It is, in fact, an elaborate account of Gurdjieff's complicated teaching: an abstruse book, and in parts baffling to a reader who is unfamiliar with chemistry and the higher mathematics. Ouspensky tells us that Gurdjieff, to whom throughout he refers as G., was really a Caucasian Greek who spoke Russian with an accent.

It is a book which may well interest many readers of THE ARYAN PATH, for Ouspensky was at great pains to expound G.'s complex system and seems, indeed, to have made exhaustive notes of his conversations with the master. Now, since G. set out to explain the whole nature of Man and was founding a kind of neo-theosophical School, it is significant that the index does not contain the word "love." After this, we are not surprised to hear G. saying "People are very fond of talking about morality. But morality is merely suggestion. *What is necessary is conscience.* We do not teach morality. We teach how to find conscience. People are not pleased when we say this. They say that we have no *love.* Simply because we do not encourage weakness and hypocrisy but, on the contrary, take off all masks. He who desires the truth will not speak of love or of Christianity because he knows how far he is from these." (The italics, here and elsewhere, are Ouspensky's.) If we regard love as a spontaneous concern for the welfare of other beings, it is difficult to see how it can be disregarded in a religio-philosophical system.

When we read of the "Sevenfold Man," of the multiplicity of little "I's" within any one who assumes that he is really an "I," or of the fire of kundalini, we may feel that G. did not adequately acknowledge his debt to India, Buddhism and modern Theosophy. His statements about kundalini might not have met with the approval of Madame Blavatsky. It is, he told his disciples, "a force put into men in order to keep them in their present state. If men could really see their true position and could understand all the horror of it, they would be unable to remain where they are even for one second. They would begin

* *In Search of the Miraculous.* By P. D. OUSPENSKY. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 399 pp. 1950. 30*s.*)

to seek a way out and they would quickly find it, *because there is a way out;* but men fail to see it simply because they are hypnotized. Kundalini is the force that keeps them in a hypnotic state."

With reference to the Last Supper, G. said "Every ceremony or rite has a value if it is performed without alteration. A ceremony is a book in which a great deal is written. Any one who understands can read it. One rite often contains more than a hundred books." On another occasion he declared that "Christ knew he must die. It had been decided thus beforehand. He knew it and his disciples knew it. And each one knew what part he had to play. But at the same time they wanted to establish a permanent link with Christ. And for this purpose he gave them his blood to drink and his flesh to eat. It was not bread and wine at all, but real flesh and real blood. The Last Supper was a *magical ceremony* similar to 'blood-brotherhood' for establishing a connection between 'astral bodies.'" Ouspensky comments "Many were repelled by what G. said about Christ and the Last Supper; others, on the contrary, felt in this a *truth* which they never could have reached by themselves."

G. had certainly a number of novel notions. For example, he taught that nothing can be achieved without sacrifice, and he did not mean a sacrifice of outward goods but, chiefly, a sacrifice of the sense of freedom because, in his view, it is an illusion. Again, "I want to explain to you that the activity of the human machine, that is, of the physical body, is controlled not by one, but by several *minds*, entirely independent of each other, having separate functions and separate spheres in which they manifest themselves. This must be understood first of all, because unless this is understood nothing else can be understood." His most startling notion was expressed in the words, "The evolution of humanity beyond a certain point or, to speak more correctly, above a certain percentage, would be fatal for the *moon*. The moon at present *feeds* on organic life, on humanity. Humanity is part of organic life; this means that humanity is *food* for the moon. If all men were to become too intelligent they would not want to be eaten by the moon." Ouspensky throws no light upon this peculiar doctrine. Of course, "Moon" may stand symbolically for the "astral plane." Who can say?

In the West we understand that a chela can make little progress if he does not absolutely obey his guru, and certainly G. demanded complete acquiescence. Anyone who reads this book will probably get an impression that he was a likeable man: but his teaching is even more complicated than that of Rudolf Steiner.

CLIFFORD BAX

II *

This first of 3 series by the late George Ivanovitch Gurdjieff is entitled "An Objectively Impartial Criticism of the Life of Man," or "Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson." It is a *pot-pourri* of cosmogonical speculations;

* *All and Everything.* First Series. By G. GURDJIEFF. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 1238 pp. 1950. 30*s.*)

comparative religion; and observations, sometimes acute, sometimes satirical, sometimes trite, sometimes fantastically overstated, on national customs and on human frailty. It is seasoned with anecdotes and with conversations which, though doubtless reformatory in aim, cannot always be recommended to the squeamish or to those demanding some reticences from the printed page.

The first chapter, "The Arousing of Thought," recommended by the author for reading thrice, arouses serious doubt of the author's sanity, later allayed. There is much misinformation in the volume, such as tracing Lamaism (now "destroyed"!) to "Saint Lama" (*sic.*); omitting Hinduism from the great existing religions; and calling modern India a leading Buddhist country. There are, however, good points. Men's "periodic reciprocal destruction" is condemned; so are animal sacrifice, human insincerity and egoism, haughtiness and servility.

The publishers' claims seem, nevertheless, as exaggerated as the author's threat

> to destroy, mercilessly, without any compromises whatsoever, in the mentation and feelings of the reader, the beliefs and views, by centuries rooted in him, about everything existing in the world.

The polysyllabism is a handicap to understanding. Despite, moreover, the author's flings at "theosophy," his debt to it, though even more to pseudo-theosophy, for several of his themes, seems obvious.

E. M. H.

Atoms of Thought: Anthology of Thoughts from George Santayana. Edited by IRA D. CARDIFF. (Philosophical Library, New York. 284 pp. 1950. $5.00).

This is an anthology from the 27 works and miscellaneous writings of "the monarch among modern materialistic or naturalistic philosophers." These selections embody his views on whatever vitally concerns man's existence, for his *credo* is:—

> The only belief that I myself entertain, because I find it irresistible, is the belief in the realm of matter, the expectation of persistence and order in a natural world.... I believe profoundly in the animality of the mind.

Consequently, non-material or spiritual values of life do not find much favour with the great rationalist. To him mysticism is a disease, mythology, a perversion of the intellect, etc.:—

> I think that pure reason in the naturalist may attain, without subterfuge, all the spiritual insights which supernaturalism goes so far out of the way to inspire.

Within the purview of his own particular *credo*, however, whatever he has to say on any subject is animated by honest, healthy and helpful scepticism and is marked by literary beauty and logic:—

> The idea of Christ is much older than Christianity.
>
> A child educated only at school is an uneducated child.
>
> It is not worldly ecclesiastics that kindle the fires of persecution, but mystics who think they hear the voice of God.

The arrangement of the extracts under an alphabetical scheme is rather confusing, as one and the same idea has been included in several sections, albeit expressed with some degree of difference. The resulting confusion has, however, fortunately been offset by a detailed index.

G. M.

Pedagogues Are Human: An Anthology of Pupils and Teachers. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by R. L. MEGROZ. (Rockliff, London. 337 pp. 1950. 9s. 6d.)

It is a happy inspiration that has enabled Mr. Mégroz to give form and significance to this rather unique anthology embracing every aspect of the pupil-teacher relationship. The verse and prose selections cover nearly five centuries of English literature, and are judiciously supplemented by Mr. Mégroz's interviews with a few prominent educationists and others. Education—whimsically described as the art of "making citizens out of little devils"—is a prime nation-building enterprise, and it is necessary that we should generously recognize the teacher's importance in evolving the great values of life. "A teacher affects eternity," says Henry Adams. "He can never tell where his influence stops." A very special burden is thrown upon the teacher of young pupils who are bored by "pen and ink and slate and ushers"—yet it is the primary teacher who is notoriously ill-paid and badly treated. On the other hand, it is wrong to assume that the teacher's job is all pain and no profit. If the child is father of the man, no less is the pupil preceptor of the teacher: "...the children will teach you far more than you will ever teach them; be an assiduous and grateful learner at their hands."

Poring over the pages of Mr. Mégroz's anthology, we renew our association with many old favourites like Goldsmith's Village Schoolmaster, Dickens's superb creation, Mr. Squeers, Dr. Birch who "keeps the flogging department in his own hands" and his assistant, Miss Raby, "who works as much as three maid servants for the wages of one." And we close the book with the feeling that pedagogues are not only human but are architects in their own right, engaged in the great task of building up a noble race of humanity

> With flame of freedom in their souls,
> And light of knowledge in their eyes.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

The Grand Peregrination: being the life and adventures of Ferñao Mendes Pinto. By MAURICE COLLIS. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 313 pp. Illustrated. 1949. 25s.)

This is essentially the story of a story, the description of the Portuguese masterpiece *Peregrination* and of its 16th-century writer's adventures, real and sometimes apparently imaginary, in the East. The modern novelist presents this unique book of travel and its author in their historical setting, with critical evaluation of both the credibility and the artistic merit of the account.

It is a fascinating story and the Peregrinator is engagingly human—a soldier of fortune more from economic pressure than from inclination; a pirate with a conscience; an observer of rare keenness; a devout Catholic and even a Jesuit novice for a while, but tolerant for his times; a critic by indirection of imperialism, exploitation, cruelty; an admirer of nobility wherever manifested; perhaps on occasion a romancer extraordinary, availing himself of the licence of literary genius, but shedding a flood of light upon life, customs and conditions between 1537 and 1557 in several Asian countries which he

visited.

The hideous brutalities and treachery admitted of the Portuguese pillagers as well as those ascribed to such an Asian tyrant as Tabin Shwéti of Burma would make the book too painful reading even for the generation of Buchenwald and Hiroshima, but for the delightful glimpses which the author gives of upper-class life in China, of the model Hindu-Buddhist King of Pasuruan in Java, "as good as a Christian could ever hope to be," as Pinto quaintly admits, and of the humble kindness of simple Chinese villagers.

It is chastening to learn that 400 years ago China had Prisoners' Welfare Societies, Java had women diplomats and—topsyturvy touch—the Portuguese custom of eating with the hands shocked the Japanese!

E. M. H.

A History of Maithili Literature, Vol. I.—*Early and Middle Periods*. By JAYAKANTA MISHRA, M. A., D. PHIL. (Tirabhukti Publications, Allahabad. 463 pp. 1949. Rs. 15/-)

This is a pioneer attempt at a critical and comprehensive survey of Mithilā's language and literature. The cordial endorsement given to the book by Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, doyen of linguists and philologists, is sufficient testimony to the success of Dr. Jayakanta Mishra's work. It not only records everything published in Maithili, but also considers the MSS. in Mithilā and Nepal, so presenting a complete picture of the literary output in Mithilā.

The author's primary object has been to investigate and establish the truth of Grierson's statement that Maithili is a language and not a dialect of Hindi or Bengali as some scholars maintain; and it seems that he has successfully achieved his aim. It is indeed curious that, though Maithili is the mother-tongue of over 20 million persons and claims recognition as a major literary language, it does not find a place in the Schedule of our Constitution.

The author divides the subject into three periods, *viz.*, the Early Period (1300-1600 A.D.), the Middle Period (1600-1860), and the New Period (1860 to the present day), the last being reserved for the next volume. The preliminary chapters on "Mithilā and Her People," "The Maithili Language and Its Script" and "Introducing Maithili Literature," clearly present the background. The author's chronological survey, which gives the sequence of authors and poets through the centuries, and his complete picture of the Maithili drama in its ramifications in Assam and Nepal are the most valuable parts of the book.

The reviewer thinks the index should preferably have been included in the present volume, instead of postponed for the next, which we eagerly await. We heartily congratulate Dr. Jayakanta Mishra on this excellent performance.

A. D. PUSALKER

Treatise on Values. By SAMUEL L. HART, PH. D. (Philosophical Library, New York. 165 pp. 1949. $3.75)

Written from the stand-point of Pragmatism, grounded on the "relativism of values," and warning that expectations of "norms of behaviour valid under all circumstances" would not be fulfilled in this treatise, this volume contains a systematic analysis of values in their multilateral ramifications. The author endorses Dewey's Instrumentalism and holds that *truth is value*. In all departments anything that would "sustain and enhance our life" has value. The author advocates discarding all metaphysical obsessions, clings to the concept of "immanent fate," and gives his readers Dewey's God, described as an "active relation between ideal and actual."

That value is a subject-object relation or reaction needs no elaborate demonstration. But the central argument has shirked the problem of values and its solution. If truth is that which is verified in actual life and experience, and if value-judgments are controlled by the physical and social worlds, the fundamental problem of evil and imperfection is either shirked or offered an inadequate solution. Today, Nagasaki and Hiroshima are assigned a particular value by the Japanese and quite a different one by the Americans. I am afraid the imposing and elusive concept of relativity of values gives no rational explanation of such startling phenomena in life.

Valuation, devaluation, transvaluation of values are still largely in the realm of conjecture and, in the contemporary world of changing values dominated by the atom-bomb civilization, it is natural to cling to the doctrine that value attaches to anything that would bring about better conditions of life. There is the rub; in what sense *better ?*

In the light of the *Vedanta* and higher Hindu thought I find it difficult to agree with the author that "we no longer seek a perennial truth." The *Gita* dictum that when the world is enveloped in darkness, the saint is wide-awake, and that the saint enjoys his blissful night, when the world is wide-awake in its mad pursuit of enriched life, contains the convincing answer to the position taken by Mr. Hart. Hugo Münsterberg was not the only one who spoke of "eternal values." The Vedanta believes in the absolute value of Atma Realization and in the practice of yoga to that end. A mere relativity of values may not be valued as spiritually satisfying. None-the-less, I am sure that Mr. Hart's volume will be welcomed by the lay and philosophical-minded public.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Hair Under a Hat. By J. P. HOGAN. (Chaterson Ltd., London, E. C. 4. 160 pp. 1949. *7s. 6d.*)

This little volume is perhaps not a "serious contribution to what may be classified as Londoniana." Its author says expressly that it is not. Nevertheless it is probable that of its many readers the most appreciative will be Londoners or those who know "fabulous, faerie" London well. For the "bits and pieces" of life which the writer asks us to regard as "one man's attempt to celebrate his joy in being alive" are for the most part enacted in that great city. But the prospective

reader should not only be intimately acquainted with this setting; he must also have a sense of humour, enjoy being brought up short to see the usual and commonplace in a new light, find pleasure in references to the words of great writers whether previously known to himself or unknown, and share Mr. Hogan's love for children and other small but significant elements in the scheme of things.

A. DE L.

Challenge of Conscience. By DENIS HAYES; Foreword by Fenner Brockway. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 406 pp. 1949. 15*s.*)

> Cell doors were kept locked while a raid was on, and a prisoner might be caught like a rat in a trap.

This quotation is not from a page in a notebook of Nazi Germany, but *Challenge of Conscience* in Britain of 1941. It is salutary to recall, as Mr. Hayes does, that at this period some English pacifists heard the siren's wail from the top floor of a jail without being let out to take shelter—a privilege which was accorded to the thieves and murderers below. Nothing is more effective than a factual record to remind us that cruelty and sadism are relative.

Mr. Hayes marshals over 400 pages of irrefutable facts which should be carefully studied by all the politicians who so earnestly exhorted citizens to die for the right to live as free and civilized men. He understands conscience from the inside. To him, facts are not so many words to be formulated into propaganda to exploit the gullibility of men—they are accessories to truths which rise above exploitation. Obviously war and the hate which it fosters are most potent weapons in the hands of those who have failed to rule their nations in peace.

The case of Roy Walker illustrates the extent to which the hypnosis of patriotism can impose itself over foresight and intelligence in time of war. Mr. Walker, having produced a workable plan for the feeding of Europe, was ordered by the Ministry of Labour to give it up and grow potatoes. Although the integrity of his conscientious objection was upheld by the Bishops of Birmingham and Chichester he was three times sentenced to imprisonment in Wormwood Scrubs, emerging from the ordeal with his hair turned grey. The highest scientific authorities supported the food relief work of this young man. The muddle of food supply to Europe after the war makes one feel that we paid a very high price for suppressing the social service which this conscientious objector desired to perform.

Challenge of Conscience, with its many instances of stands against conscription, makes it abundantly clear that the popular view of C.O.'s as "sissies" or cowards is incorrect. It shows them to be normal young men and women having perhaps rather more virtue, courage and intelligence than the average. They are pioneers who suggest a new way to clear the mental gutters of greed and power-seeking from which all wars arise. They demonstrate, like the martyrs of the Middle Ages who went to the stake for believing that the Plagues of Europe were caused by inadequate drains, that peace can come only by a psychological revolution within each human being, which frees the mind from the bacilli of hate.

We recommend Mr. Hayes's book to all who wish to understand rather than condemn the makers of peace.

DENNIS GRAY STOLL

Language and Philosophy: Studies in Method. By MAX BLACK. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., and Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 264 pp. 1949. 28*s.*)

Immanuel Kant discussed knowledge "in the light of the conditions." In consequence, he found a new path in philosophy; for metaphysics, queen of the sciences, had outraged these conditions and so was henceforth impossible. Strangely enough, it has become fashionable in philosophy, once again, to decry metaphysics; it being forbidden this time, however, not by the conditions of knowledge but by the conditions of language. And in these 10 occasional papers Mr. Max Black has succeeded, largely through an unusual gift for lucid exposition, though perhaps more by indirection than of set purpose, in making this strange turn in philosophical affairs intelligible to us.

A feature of the new "linguistic approach," one which the dullest could notice, is the prevalence in its discussions of what has been rather brilliantly described (I think by Mr. Duncan-Jones of Birmingham University) as "exorcistic argument." Always we are led to see that after all, *there is no problem!* An illuminating case in point (the theme of what is perhaps Mr. Black's central chapter) is that perennial skeleton in the logician's cupboard, the problem of "justifying" inductive inference. The sun has risen upon many mornings; but can we properly infer from that, that he will rise tomorrow? Do we really know?

We are tempted to say that the question cannot be answered—so many famous answers have been unsatisfactory. And it is irritating to the layman to learn that this hoary problem (like many another, according to the latest voices in philosophy) "is all a matter of words." What the author succeeds in making us see, however, is that the word "know," in this dispute, so shifts its meaning during our discourse, that we are not really asking anything in putting our question. The "question" the ages have failed to answer, they could not expect to answer; for it isn't a question. We want to be sure about the sun tomorrow? Yes. But we want to be sure in the way we are sure he is shining today; or else in the way we are sure that 2 and 2 make 4; but to be sure in either of *these* ways about *tomorrow's* sun is to forbid it to be tomorrow's. We are not asking anything. We are talking nonsense. And this, sometimes, can be very good news.

Only sometimes, however. There is a risk here. There is a retort for which we must be prepared (such must be our comment on the linguistic approach) when the anxious inquirer is informed that he is not asking anything. "*Ach so?*" he will say, "Then I am not in any trouble?" And we may gather from his tone that we have said something profoundly false. And here we are perhaps on the track of an explanation for another phenomenon, of which we may hope Mr. Black will one day treat—the new interest in philosophical therapy, the almost unbelievable return of philosophy to its ancient and long-neglected function of ministering *logically* to the sicknesses of the soul.

J. W. SCOTT

Outlines of a Metaphysics: The Absolute-Relative Theory. By FRANKLIN J. MATCHETTE. (Philosophical Library, New York. 108 pp. 1949. $3.75).

The relation of the Absolute and the relative is a difficult subject, lying at the core of metaphysics. Mr. Matchette, a successful business man turned philosopher, has over-simplified it. The relative is given. The Absolute and its nature are inferred—through the principle of *duality*. This is not very convincing.

Again, through the principle of duality, it is proved that the Absolute is the First and Final Cause of the universe. This is not good philosophy. How can the permanent, timeless and eternal begin to be active and create a world, without contradicting its own nature? And how can the Absolute create something opposed to its own nature, and not contained within It?

For the author, the Absolute is the only Ultimate Reality, and empirical existence has value according to its nearness to the Absolute. Matter has the greatest divergence from the Absolute; Life is the next higher; Mind is higher still. Here, with Matchette, the process of evolution stops. In this, we come nearest to the Absolute. Man belongs to a dual realm,—matter and spirit. But all his actions in the physical world still *tend* towards the Absolute.

The author posits a Zero-Atom Unit, the ultimate building-block of the universe, which mediates between the Absolute and empirical entities. In it, mind as well as life is potential. All finite entities, including man, are only "combinatorial complexes" of it. But if man is only a combinatorial complex created by God, is not his freedom a puppet freedom? There is no room here for the law of ethical justice called Karma.

The book does credit to a non-professional thinker, but his theory in its philosophic content may be said to be an expression of the Christian outlook.

G. R. MALKANI

The Triumph of the Tree. By JOHN STEWART COLLIS. (Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London. 254 pp. 1950. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

Normally one does not go to books to learn. Experience teaches; books merely echo, document, or rationalize our experience. But I have learned a great deal from Mr. Collis's book. He has made me feel, in a way I had never done before, the silence and sadness of the Carboniferous Age before the air was breathable; he has made me see how the first conifers rising from the primeval fern forests embodied a New Idea, "the idea of not falling down." Since I read his book I have seen with new eyes, even in our little urban woods, the noble Uprightness of trees and their majestic stillness on windless days. I have seen, not men as trees walking, but trees as men standing still.

Mr. Collis, in short, has written a remarkable history, not merely of the Tree Triumphant, but of men's wisdom in spite of superstition, and their folly in spite of emancipation.

> Forests are so much more than meets the eye. They are fountains. They are oceans. They are pipes. They are dams. Their work ramifies through the whole economy of nature.

Men have brought calamity upon themselves. In their folly and greed they have disrupted the economy of nature. They have discovered the

primeval forest in the earth's bowels. They have discovered coal. They have invented industrialism and brought a Nemesis upon themselves in the shape of our lamentable urban culture.

England today has a population of fifty millions, "90 per cent. of whom work at non-agricultural activities caused by the carboniferous forests. ...When food fails presently to come in from other countries how will the fifty millions get on?" Mr. Collis pins his faith on the fact that "there are in England today agriculturalists with astonishing practical genius combined with comprehensive ecological insight," and he looks to their sanity to guide us through "the greatest compromise England has ever been called upon to make, the compromise between industry and agriculture." His formulation of the choice before us defies repudiation.

J. P. HOGAN

A Confucian Notebook. By EDWARD HERBERT. (Wisdom of the East Series, John Murray, London. 89 pp. 1950. 4*s*.)

This attractive little book is primarily concerned, as the title suggests, with the greatest of all Chinese Sages—some would say, the greatest Sage that the world has yet seen—and with the substance of his teaching, which we call Confucianism. It is no systematic exposition, but consists of a series of short essays on certain selected points which, taken together, will convey to the uninstructed reader enough of the general sense and setting of Confucianism to make him wish to pursue his studies further. As Dr. Waley says in his foreword, it may be ranked as an "*oeuvre de vulgarisation*," yet is far from being unscholarly. Indeed, it makes one wish that something similar had been compiled about philosophers of other countries besides China. Why should not Socrates, Plato and Aristotle undergo the same treatment that has been accorded by Mr. Herbert to Confucius, Mencius and Mo Ti? Perhaps the answer is that material is lacking for the sort of "divine chit-chat" that we find in these pages. Chinese philosophy follows no logical method of presentation, but is for the most part conveyed to the student in small separate doses, propositions being simply stated and left at that without much attempt at elucidation or proof. On the other hand, touches of human interest are far more frequent than with us, whether it be Confucius passing a frank opinion on some of his disciples, or being held up to ridicule by teachers of a rival school; or Mencius attacking Yang Chu, the exponent of enlightened egoism, with the same venom as Mo Ti, who preached universal love.

As many as a dozen of the 33 "notes" in this book deal with Taoism in its various aspects; and this is not surprising, for the understanding of Confucianism can only gain by contrast with a doctrine that clashes with it at so many points. Chuang Tzu's work has been largely drawn upon in this connection, but more frequent reference might have been made to Lieh Tzu, whose anecdotes about Confucius show the Master in a much more favourable light. It must be added, however, that Mr. Herbert's treatment of his different subjects is generally remarkable for acuteness of insight as well as ability to impart a large amount of information in a very small space.

LIONEL GILES

The Philosophy of Plato. By G. C. FIELD. (Home University Library, Oxford University Press, London. 219 pp. 1949. 5*s.*)

The Home University Library is meant for the general rather than the specialist reader, and so it is tempting to open Professor Field's compendium of Plato's doctrine at the chapter entitled "Plato To-Day." For we feel that Plato has close relevance to our day. He lived in a war-torn world, the citizen of an empire that had lost its supremacy. He knew such things as the class-war, the incoherences of democracy, the rise of dictatorships out of the confusion of popular government, the infiltrations of "fifth columns"—the agents of Persian despotism and of the ideological fanatics of the Spartan system—the decay of morals under the critique of nihilistic scepticism and the "rationalization" of the Will-to-Power as a philosophy of tyranny. On all these, extremely topical, subjects, Plato's dialogues remain a mine of wisdom and warning.

And yet Professor Field is quite right in cautioning his readers not to treat Plato altogether as if he were a combatant in our modern controversies. His was a world of tiny city communities, without industrialism or scientific invention, the slave of small distances, with no ideal of a world unity to temper its jealous little nationalisms, with no far-reaching plans of economic reconstruction, with no idea of evolution, except as the decay of an original Golden Age.

The more prudently we recognize this, the more we shall be inclined to fall back upon the parts of Plato's philosophy which he himself undoubtedly thought the most important, his vindication of the reality of the spiritual realm, the world of the eternal Ideas (which Professor Field prefers to call Forms, to avoid confusing them with the subjective "ideas" of this or that person) and of the Divine Life infusing matter and shaping it into harmony with the perfect Forms. Whatever he may or may not have drawn from the Eleusinian mysteries of Greece or the "hidden wisdom" of the Egyptian temples, or Pythagoras' mysticism of numbers, Plato remains in the great line of those who have believed that behind the veil of material appearances there is a world of spiritual splendour in which the human soul can participate. Professor Field's little treatise, a masterpiece of concision, lucidity and detailed knowledge of his subject, is an introduction to the Platonic philosophy that could hardly be improved.

D. L. MURRAY

The Twentieth Century. By HANS KOHN. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 242 pp. 1949. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Early in 1848, a landmark in the history of Europe, France became once again a republic; Marx and Engels published their *Communist Manifesto* and opened a new line of approach to the masses; and the first international peace congress met in Brussels. The European world, to all appearances, was being made safe for liberty, progress and peace. But soon the hope engendered in the minds of the people by these events vanished, and the germs of a malignant growth were discernible in the blood-and-iron policy of Bismarck, brought to maturity in

our day by Hitler. Side by side with the birth of modern militarist Germany, Russia was also emerging into power, though in a different way. At the same time that Wagner and Marx and Nietszche were inspiring the outlook of their countrymen, Chaadayev, Khomyakov, Belinsky, Herzen and Bakunin were rousing Russian thought.

Standing midway in the twentieth century, at a period which looks as "decisive a turning-point as the corresponding epoch of a hundred years before," the author takes stock of the present situation :—

> Fifty years after the turn of the century, men and peoples live full of apprehension, doubt and distrust. Some find refuge in a fanatical faith and in reliance upon infallible leaders of the peoples ; others seek evasion of responsibility in simplifying and comforting panaceas ; many are simply weary and have given up the attempt to understand and to act.

How to remedy this state of affairs ? By vigilance and "intelligent and couragous action." The only silver lining to the cloud, according to the author, lies in the collaboration of Western Europe with North America.

One great merit of this book is that it shows us the different facets of ideologies like imperialism, racialism, Fascism and National Socialism.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

Criticism and Creation. By HERBERT J. C. GRIERSON. (Chatto and Windus, London. 127 pp. 1949. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

This new volume from Sir Herbert Grierson consists of a collection of essays and addresses dealing with criticism itself, with verse translation, with the metaphysics of Donne and of Milton, and with Milton in relation to political liberty. The author is a scholar with a fine sense of poetry, and anything he writes is not only weighty but alive.

Perhaps the modern reader will find his essay on Milton and Liberty the most interesting. Sir Herbert points out that Milton's justification of divorce no less than his justification of the execution of Charles on the ground that it was for the good of the people, suggests that he was a precursor of later liberalism in thought and politics. But he adds that this was not really so for two reasons—namely, that Milton remained an orthodox Christian, and that he began increasingly to distrust the wisdom of the majority.

" Who denies, " asked Milton, " that there may be times in which the vicious may constitute the majority of the citizens ? " Sir Herbert, having quoted a passage in which the above question is put, then adds :—

> Milton found the solution of the problem of liberty in the Christian doctrine of the Fall, which for him, as for Johnson, as for Newman, as for the late Lord Salisbury, as for the Christian revival of today, was the solution of the insoluble problem of evil. See Mr. C. S. Lewis on the problem of pain.

Those are weighty words, and we should ponder them. But personally I do not feel that they offer us the only view. Is the problem of pain so insoluble as all that ? Would we not do better to drop these Christian gentlemen and to turn back to Heraclitus, for example ?

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

This Human Nature: A Commentary, and an Exposition. By CHARLES DUFF. (Thinker's Library, C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. 298 pp. 1950. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

On Mr. Duff's admission, italicized for emphasis on p. 285, "*human nature does change*: often for the worse." For further proof of this one need look no further than Mr. Duff's own outlook. For after ranging over the whole of human history from the bludgeon to the atom bomb, he finds that "the most significant possibilities for the future of human nature are to be found in Soviet Russia." Four books of the five are deliberate denigration of our own cultural heritage: an essay in intellectual deracination which leads naturally up to an account of neuroses of the West: hysterics, katatonics, sadists, epileptics, depressives, paranoiacs, maniacs, and homosexuals.

Such deliberate writing down can only be accomplished by drastic foreshortening of the perspective. Society originated in sex, developed through real estate and juju, attained morality by "the superb influence of hell," and is now (p. 284) doomed. We all know the remedy: indeed, since Mr. Duff originally wrote this book in 1930, we should have known it 20 years ago. The searing nature of his condemnation of the Church as a "monopoly of mysticism" cannot be explained by being written in the heat of the moment. This, we are told, is the "definitive edition." It is Mr. Duff's last word.

There is nothing whatever of the scientific spirit: nothing but the projection of arbitrarily selected details of the past to fill in the yawning gaps in Mr. Duff's argument. This is Toynbee with a twist. But, thanks to Mr. Duff's explosive style, the reader never yawns. On every page one looks about for the author to remonstrate with him: but since he is well camouflaged behind his print, one has to be content with the observation that it is a stimulating book. Many of his remarks would serve as bones of contention for discussion groups—"A European Socialist is now often a hypocritical capitalist"; just as many of the obscure historical details which he has resurrected will be new to those who have not read his earlier books. Who, for instance, would have known that Mr. Marwood had a place in the new hagiography? Certainly few Englishmen. Yet he was "a master of the hangman's great art." (He introduced "the long drop.") Or Hecatæa of Thasos who receives more notice than Thomas Aquinas? These, and other interesting details are embedded in the 298-page synopsis of Mr. Duff's researches into human nature.

W. H. G. ARMYTAGE

Primal Healing. By A. GEORGE HALL, PH.D., LL.D., D.D. (Pearson Foundation, London. 82 pp. 1950. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

Primal Healing, as taught in the Pearson Foundation College, London, is said to be "a new system of healing the ills of mankind by the scientific application of SPIRITUAL POWER." This "Power" is the "first cause of the universe" and is said to be contacted by the practitioner through rigorous discipline, complete silence, contemplation and meditation, and then passed into the body of the patient. The patient must be in complete sym-

pathy and co-operative, and will feel the "Power" pouring into and throughout his body, bringing about adjustment of body and mind, with the resultant, perfect health.

Much in this book is true, but without a deeper understanding of life than the average man possesses today, much will be misunderstood and may lead to dangerous results. Do we know enough of this "Power" even on that plane of Nature where it can be contacted, to use it? Do we know what happens during its passage through the practitioner's body? Do we know the complete effect of this transmission to the patient? Is there anywhere today where one can truly be taught how to contact the "reservoir" of Force, and how to use it without harm? Granted that complete adjustment to the harmony of the universe will bring perfect health, many will demur to the practice of allowing another to pour "Power" into him for the healing of mental or physical disease.

ETHEL BESWICK

This World and That: An Analytical Study of Psychic Communications. By PHOEBE D. PAYNE and LAURENCE J. BENDIT. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 194 pp. 1950. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Dry technicalities and emotional subjectivity are both avoided in this lucid analysis. The authors—a medical psychologist and his wife, a natural-born psychic—give also the results of their personal experience and convictions (the last as suggestions only), the whole being linked up with wider philosophical concepts in an idiom neither too erudite nor "catch-penny" in style.

They draw a picture of threefold man—mind-ego as the conscious centre of identity, balanced between timeless Spirit and a body motivated by instinct patterns and subject to earth time. After death, through this contact, the ego may well retain the earthy characteristics for a period, and integrate the spiritualized qualities of the earth-personality with the permanent self. Man's consciousness evolves from mass instinct (direct, unconscious, psychic perception), found most often in primitive tribes. Rational individualism develops in the mind-ego at the expense of instinctive psychism. The limitation, however, establishes self-identity, which must then expand to the inner world again, consciously and positively. The negative, passive psychism of the medium is an unnatural regression.

Interesting examples support the suggestion to investigate the powers of the living before attributing all phenomena to the "dead." Ghosts, obsessions, superstitions, healing, etc., are touched upon equally rationally. One could have wished that the survey had included earlier interpretations, such as those collected by Mme. Blavatsky in *Isis Unveiled* and elsewhere. No mention is made, for example, of the wide-spread concept of the astral light, with its power of retaining all images, and the only references to the real consciousness of the "dead" are ambiguous. Nevertheless, the book is a good one for an intelligent inquirer.

E. W.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE INDIAN DARSANAS

[Below we print a criticism and a rejoinder on the article of Prof. M. Hiriyanna which appeared in our June number.—ED.]

I.—By R. Naga Raja Sarma

Apropos of the "Six Points of View" sketched by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, in THE ARYAN PATH for June 1950, I request you to permit me to point out some inaccuracies in the contribution.

(1) Prof. M. Hiriyanna began with *six* points of view, and ended by observing that there are "only *four* world-views advocated in the six systems." It is indeed a strange piece of information that "Nyāya and Yoga have no such views." If Prof. Hiriyanna maintains a merger between Sānkhya and Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśesika, he will have to admit a like merger between the *two* Mīmāmsās, and then the world-views would stand reduced to 3 and not 4.

(2) I regret that Prof. Hiriyanna has not given the readers of THE ARYAN PATH the traditional Indian view. A point of view indicates a *rapprochement* between subject and object. The knower is the subject. The object is the known. But most important is the *means* of knowing. There are thus 2 points of view: (1) that of *Pramana, i.e.*, means of knowledge, and (2) that of *Prameya*—the subject-matter of knowledge. Nyāya and Vaiśesika deal with an analysis of *Pramanas*. Sānkhya, the Pūrva and the Uttara Mīmāmsās deal with *Prameya*. The means of escape from evil, sin and suffering is the special subject-matter of Yoga. The distinctions are real, vital and material.

(3) I disagree with Prof. Hiriyanna's contention that Vaiśesika stresses the ontological side, and Nyāya the epistemological. Both are concerned deeply with both. The difference pointed out between the two on the basis of categories is illusory. While Nyāya counts as many as 16 basic categories, Vaiśesika is satisfied with 7.

(4) According to Prof. Hiriyanna, the individual soul is "pervasive" and theoretically "present everywhere." Omnipresent in the English language is not the same as pervasive. I am afraid Prof. Hiriyanna has not correctly rendered the term *vibhu* as applied to *Jiva*. If, according to Vaiśesika, self is "present everywhere," Vaiśesika would be identical with Advaita.

(5) Prof. Hiriyanna writes that with Vedānta "actual *monism* appears." Many European, Indian and American authors have been responsible for spreading the claim that Vedānta is monism. It is *not*. Ramanuja and Madhava fought monism tooth and nail. If certain writers fail to mention Ramanuja and Madhava, their systems do not thereby cease to exist.

(6) That is, however, a small matter. Madhava can take care of himself. But what is the "conjectural

insight" into the "essence" of Brahman—which Prof. Hiriyanna writes our knowledge of our own self can give us? Conjectural insight is a contradiction in terms. The Realization of Brahman is not conjectural insight. Daily, momentary knowledge of oneself is absolutely unable to give any insight into the nature of Brahman—let alone Its essence. Prof. Hiriyanna discovered a better *cogito* than the Father of Modern Philosophy. Descartes said, "I think—therefore, I am." Prof. Hiriyanna says, in effect, "I know myself, therefore, I am Brahman."

(7) Lastly, I see no gain in denying distinctions and emphasizing artificial unity or identity. All world-teachers, Christ, Buddha, Krishna, Muhammad, and others, have emphasized the fact that all are children of God. All breathe the same oxygen. All live for a span and die. These familiar phenomena do not take mankind anywhere near the *dvaitic* or the *advaitic* realization.

Six points of view? They are like the six blind men of Hindusthan, each of whom described the elephant in terms of the part he touched. If Vedānta is restricted to monism, it is as good as a blind man. The correct view is that *Pramana* point of view is an indispensable prolegomenon to the *Prameya* view-point. The goal can be reached only when the *Sadhana* (Yoga) point of view is understood in correct theory and translated into proper practice.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

II.—By M. Hiriyanna

I have carefully considered the above remarks of Dr. Nagaraja Sarma on my article. The following is my reply to the various points raised:

Item (1). The two Mīmāmsās may be dealt with together. Many Vedāntins have done so. But some, like Śaṁkara, demur to it, and make a rather sharp distinction between the two. Further, the Mīmāmsakās, as a class, differ from the Vedāntins, as a class, in the emphasis they lay on the *karma-kāṇḍa* as distinguished from the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. The agreement among Indian thinkers about the combined treatment of the Nyāya and the Vaiśesika is much more general. This, as well as the practice of writers of popular text-books on the doctrines, like Viśvanātha and Annam Bhaṭṭa, is my justification for considering them as together forming a single system. As regards the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, I admit an important difference, though their postulates are mostly the same. The latter is theistic, while the former is not.

Item (2). Dr. Sarma means to say that there are several ways of exhibiting the relation among the six systems. I agree. I indicated one of them, but did not say that it was the *only one*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, for example, explains the same in a different way in the Introduction to his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra*. Some of these other explanations may be better or worse than mine. But that question was not before me when I wrote the article.

Item (3). Dr. Sarma says that the difference I point out between the Nyāya and the Vaiśesika is 'illusory.'

But by referring immediately thereafter to the 7 categories of the Vaiśesika and 16 of the Nyāya, he is saying, in substance, what I have stated. For the former are primarily of ontological significance; and 15 of the latter are primarily of logical or epistemological significance, they being concerned with the discovery and defence of truth.

Item (4). Dr. Sarma says that my rendering of *vibhu*, as applied to the *Jīva* in the Vaiśesika, is not correct. Possibly. But the *Kārikāvalī* uses not only *vibhu* (st. 51) in this connection, which Dr. Randle, for instance, renders as "all-pervading" (see his *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 143) but also *sarva-gata* (st. 26) which means "present everywhere." The late Prof. Kuppuswami Sastry, whose knowledge of the Indian systems is known to have been quite profound, uses "all-pervasive" and "present everywhere" in this connection, the very expressions I happened to use (see his *Primer of Logic* p. 100). To say that the Vaiśesika self is "present everywhere" need not make it the same as the Advaitic self, for while the Advaita ultimately believes in a single self, the Vaiśesika does in a plurality of selves.

Item (5). I speak of Vedānta as monistic. But I do not deny that the Upanishads may admit of a pluralistic interpretation. My statement is supported by the fact that at least half-a-dozen forms of Vedānta are monistic —those of Bhartṛprapañca, Bhartṛhari, Śaṁkara, Bhāskara, etc. Having decided to count Vedānta as *one* of the six systems and chosen the monistic form of it, I could not include any other type of Vedānta without dropping some other doctrine. Haribhadra Sūri (8th century A.D.), to whom I referred in the article, omits Vedānta altogether from his account of the six systems. Surely, he did not mean that there was no Vedānta at all or that it was not a system of philosophy.

Item (6). Dr. Sarma asks me what "conjectural insight" means. It means insight which is not complete; but, so far as it goes, it carries certitude with it and is therefore not a mere guess. It gives us a passing glimpse of the final nature of the self which, according to Advaita, is fundamentally the same as Brahman. I do not see any contradiction in the term. I may add that I take the expression from William James.

Item (7). Dr. Sarma says that he sees "no gain in denying distinctions and emphasizing artificial unity or identity." I do not agree. Comparison and contrast make for clarity of view. In this connection, I might invite Dr. Sarma's attention to what is known as *sādharmya-vaidharmya—nirūpaṇam* in the *Kārikāvalī*, (st. 13-34), and the *Kaṇāda Sūtra*, (I. i. 8 ff.).

M. HIRIYANNA

Mysore City,
29th June, 1950.

Lord, from self conceit deliver me.
Sever from self, and occupy with thee.
This self is captive to earth's good and ill.
Make me beside myself, and set me free.

OMAR KHAYYAM

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

The Buddha's declaration that "from ignorance spring all the evils. From knowledge comes the cessation of this mass of misery," while made in a more general context, might have served as text for the editorial, "The Real Enemy," in the British Council's organ, *Britain To-day*, for July.

The Editor defends such organized efforts as those of that body, the Arts Council, the Travel Association, etc., to promote cultural acquaintanceship, maintaining the fostering of mutual understanding to be highly important to peace and as deserving of support as the armed forces. Such efforts are poles apart from propaganda with an axe to grind. Propaganda, with its coloured and misleading statements, seeks to make partisans, whereas cultural dissemination tries to make friends upon the basis of understanding sympathy, which can be built for permanence only upon truth.

The political and legal institutions of a nation and the expressions of its social conscience give an objective picture, but the Editor maintains that

> history as reflected in past literature is more authentic even than the record of the historian....Contemporary literature and art are a reliable reflection of the present phase of a nation's mind....If we can induce foreigners to read our literature, past and present, we may or may not show them what they will like, but we cannot fail to show what we are. And that is precisely what is wanted.

Each nation's individuality has something to contribute to the rest.

The hope that by such efforts on behalf of cultural dissemination it may be possible to stave off barbarism altogether and to avert return to the Dark Ages may seem to some belated, but "the superior spiritual force which resides in truth, and is the only basis of real culture" can surely help to put to flight the hosts of darkness.

This is the underlying aim of many cultural as well as unsectarian social organizations. Among such is the Indian Institute of Culture in Bangalore, of which THE ARYAN PATH is the organ. The Institute celebrated its fifth Birthday on the 12th of August, under the presidency of Rajadharmaprasakta Shri T. Singaravelu Mudaliar, the chairman of its advisory committee.

A somewhat unique feature of this organization is that its members pledge themselves

"to endeavour to cultivate the attitude of brotherliness in my daily living."

By its programme of activities the Institute attempts "to fit its members and friends to become true citizens of a Republic of Brotherhood in this land, and brothers to all men and nations throughout the world." It tries to hold aloft the banner of true patriotism, above distinctions of provinces and languages, which in serving

India considers the good of the entire world and favours World Citizenship as a strengthener of national loyalty. While appreciating the creative and constructive labours of modern scientists, who know how to know more, the Institute stresses the value of reverence for Nature, the moral values which endow all knowledge with the spirit of philanthropy. It emphasizes the value of Religion as a Way of Life, deprecating the mummeries of dividing creeds founded on blind belief.

The Institute is endeavouring to form a Nucleus of those who will serve their fellow-men with faith born of wisdom. The thinking principle widens the horizons of knowledge but it is the discerning principle alone which deepens insight and creates Wisdom which soothes as well as enlightens, which ennobles the character of the individual while energizing him to acts of sacrifice and service.

The Report of the Institute for 1949 is just published and is available at No. 6, North Public Square Road, Basavangudi, Bangalore 4.

In this issue we publish two articles on our Secular State. The question is vitally important and needs clear exposition on the fallacies and truths of secularism. Commenting on the views of *Harijan*, the Editor of *The Indian Social Reformer* offers some very valuable comments and we reproduce them here :—

According to the *Harijan*, a secular State means nothing more than that one religion will not be favoured over all others. This is good as far as it goes but it is not good enough. Secularism means that religion will not be allowed to meddle in public affairs; or, if one be permitted to draw on the scriptures for the phrase, it will be told to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. In India, the context which concerns us most, no man will be permitted to plead the excuse of religion for any public act of his; nor will it be permissible for him to invest with ritual and ceremony any function of the State. Mr. Mashruwala naïvely asks whether it is intended that the President of the Republic will be required to forsake his faith during his tenure of the presidentship. Nothing of the kind. But he will be required to confine his worship to private occasions and to stand out before the nation as the first citizen of India, plain and simple. If that is not good enough for a man, surely there is no need for him to be our President. To follow the policy recommended by Mr. Mashruwala of allowing Hindu, Muslim, Parsi and Christian Governors and Presidents to establish in their time any worship they like and associate it with the governorship and presidency, is to introduce religious chaos and anarchy. We warn the nation that this is the thin edge of the wedge and, once tolerated, the sequel will be insistence by the majority on imposing its own forms and rituals. How quaint an attitude Mr. Mashruwala's solution can lead one into is shown by his suggestion that, where between organizers of a function and the chief performer at it there exists a difference of religion, some common form may be evolved. Why indulge in all these tortures of the soul? We believe that the two faces of Secularism must be equally respected; Freedom of worship to every one in the country; and scrupulous confining of all religious matters to private life.